Does deterrence change preferences? Evidence from a natural experiment by Cavatora, Elisa & Groom, Ben
Does deterrence change preferences? Evidence from a natural 
experiment
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104139/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Cavatora, Elisa and Groom, Ben (2020) Does deterrence change preferences? 






Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
Does deterrence change preferences?
Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Elisa Cavatorta∗ and Ben Groom†
April 18, 2020
Abstract
The deterrent effects of counter-violence initiatives could backfire if they
cause preferences to change so that the perceived gains from violent actions
increase. We test the preference-change hypothesis in a quasi-experimental
design exploiting the random location of segments of the wall between the
West Bank and Israel, an initiative intended to deter armed resistance. We
undertake incentivized decision tasks with Palestinians to measure key indi-
vidual traits that determine the valuation of political actions: preferences for
risk, uncertainty and time delay. We show that people living close to the
wall become more risk-tolerant, ambiguity averse and impatient than those
unexposed to the wall, and this effect is amplified for people both exposed
to and isolated (from the West Bank) by the wall. Preference-change could
explain how repressive initiatives appear to perpetuate cycles of violence and
resistance.
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Michaeli, Philipp Reiss, Erwin Bulte, Steffen Huck, Orazio Attanasio and two anonymous refer-
ees. The authors are grateful to Haneen Ghazawneh and Aysheh Alawi for excellent assistance
throughout the study and Farida, Fofo, Reem, Samah and Arwa for the data collection. Elisa
Cavatorta gratefully acknowledges the support of the AXA Research Fund. This fieldwork has
benefited from a financial grant from the Global Development Network-Economic Research Forum
and a faculty grant from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. The
contents and recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of the Global Development
Network-Economic Research Forum. The responsibility for any errors or omissions is our own.
1
Strategies to deal with conflict in cross-border disputes are traditionally based
on the principle of deterrence. Many counter-insurgency (counter-terrorism and
more generally counter-violence) initiatives aim to deter violent acts by increasing
the costs or reducing the perceived payoffs from committing them.1 The logic be-
hind these initiatives is supported by the host of game-theoretic models used in
the political science and international relations literature. The cornerstone assump-
tion of these models is that actors decide whether to engage in an action (wage
war/engage in armed action/insurge) if the discounted net gain from the action is
greater than that of inaction (or some other action). In short, observed actions
are goal-orientated and the outcome of either rational choice or a well-defined be-
havioural economic model.2
By this argument, the decision to participate in aggressive action depends on
how the perpetrators evaluate the pros and cons. The perceived gains are evaluated
based on a set of preferences, the most important of which are the attitudes over risk,
uncertainty and temporal trade-offs. There is a risk of failure in performing an act of
aggression as well as uncertainty over the chances of success or failure.3 Actors must
also trade-off present and future benefits and costs. The costs of aggression now may
1Fines for speeding provide a deterrent, as do traffic calming measures. Both increase the costs
of speeding, but only the latter by physical means. Our definition of deterrence includes both types
of policy.
2From hereon we use the term “rational agent” or “rationality” to refer to a utility maximizing
agent. Such agents could also be subject to bounded rationality or the biases commonly described
in behavioral economics.
3Risk refers to situations in which the possible outcomes are known along with their probabili-
ties. An uncertain situation is one where the possible outcomes and probabilities are unknown. As
in decision-theory, we refer to uncertainty about the probability distribution of (known) outcomes
as ‘ambiguity’. E.g. betting on the toss of a coin is a situation of risk, since the probabilities are
well defined. Betting on whether a black or white ball will be drawn from an urn when the pro-
portions of each are unknown is a decision under ambiguity, since the probabilities are unknown.
Risk and ambiguity preferences are theoretically distinct and experimental evidence suggests they
are uncorrelated (e.g. Levy et al., 2010; Cohen, Tallon and Vergnaud, 2011). Decisions under risk
and ambiguity also seem to activate separate neural systems (Huettel et al., 2006).
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only reap benefits or punishments in the future, and future net benefits are typically
discounted. Put differently, these preferences govern the valuation of the net gains,
which in turn determines the final decision towards action versus inaction. The
deterrence argument is based on preferences being stable and remaining unchanged
over time, and goes like this: given a set of preferences, set the deterrent-policy in
such a way that the perceived net gain from committing an aggressive action is lower
than that of inaction, and the rational actor will refrain from the action. Aggression
is thereby deterred and the objectives of the policy-maker are met.
Our results highlight the possibility of a fundamental flaw in this argument.
Consider the possibility that the policy, originally intended as a deterrent-policy,
changes the way the affected actors evaluate the costs and benefits of committing
any given aggressive action. In other words, rather than being stable, the policy
changes the preferences which govern the actors’ decisions.4 An agent whose pref-
erences are changed by a policy will evaluate the same action differently after the
policy compared to before, resulting in a different appraisal of the overall net gain of
committing the action. As a result, the same deterrent will not work in the expected
way. Indeed, it may not work at all. To illustrate the point, suppose an actor is
indifferent between committing violent action or not. A deterrent policy is intro-
duced and it changes her risk preferences so that she becomes more risk tolerant
(we will explain later why this may be the case). With these new preferences, the
risk inherent in taking a violent action now weighs less in the overall calculation of
the net gains. Even though the cost of committing the action may be increased by
the imposed deterrent policy, the actor’s appraisal of the net gain of being violent
4By preferences and ‘preference change’ we refer to fundamental attitudinal traits, rather than
temporary ‘expressed decisions’ which may have been influenced by transitory stimuli, such as
framing or the emotional state of the respondent at the time.
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may now be perceived greater than not being violent. Violent action might actu-
ally increase. The policy has yielded a counter-productive outcome: more violence
rather than less, because the preferences which guide decisions have changed.
Empirical observations indeed suggest that deterrence does not always work. At
the macro-level, it is observed that hostile initiatives often invite more resistance,
locking countries into conflict-traps: e.g. increased military spending (Collier et al.,
2003), political repression and indiscriminate violence (Walter, 2004; Kalyvas, 2004).
Micro-level studies suggest that when repression is used it invokes more violence
rather than deterring it, fomenting violent extremism (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009;
Canetti et al., 2013), harnessing intra-group retaliation (Zeitzoff, 2014), inciting hate
and inducing mobilization (De Mesquita, 2005). We argue that changes in prefer-
ences can cause these political behaviors. Violent actions are characterized by risk,
uncertainty and temporal trade-offs, making preferences for risk, uncertainty and
time discounting particularly important for decision making. Although preference-
change provides a clear mechanism for the failure of deterrence, this mechanism is
seldom tested because preferences are usually unobserved. Our approach overcomes
this problem. The deterrent initiative that we analyze is the construction of the bar-
rier wall between Israel and the West Bank. This initiative was originally intended
to deter aggressive actions by the targeted population. We show that the location of
the wall can be treated as a natural experiment which randomly separates the Pales-
tinian populations of interest. We collected original data from incentivized decision
tasks that elicit preferences for risk, uncertainty and time delay, which then form
the basis of a direct test of preference change. We exploit the natural experiment of
the wall by collecting individual preference data in villages either side of the wall,
and with no wall. These data allow us to identify causal evidence in the field of the
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existence of unintended effects of initiatives based on the principle of deterrence.
We show that the policy of the wall changes the preferences of affected Palestinians
by making them more risk tolerant, impatient and averse to uncertainty. We argue
that such changes occur because the wall generates anger and resentment, and that
they may lead to counter-productive outcomes and prolongation of conflict.
Our research design tackles the identification of causal effects by using the exact
location of sections of the wall between the State of Israel and the West Bank region
of the Palestinian territories. We exploit the fact that the wall runs inside the
Palestinian territories, its final location was largely unknown beforehand and that,
in some areas, the wall construction halted for reasons external to the characteristics
of the local population. Indeed, sometimes the precise location of the wall changed
accidentally, unexpectedly leaving Palestinian villages either side of the wall or in
some instances literally dividing the same village into two parts. Furthermore,
because of a stringent residence permit regime, people hardly move from the areas
isolated by the wall. These conditions, random and unexpected separation and
limited migration, make the division of villages by the wall a natural experiment
(Dunning, 2012), which provides as-if random allocation of people into two treatment
conditions: (i) close to the wall in areas isolated between the wall and the border
with Israel; and (ii) close to wall in areas not isolated from the West Bank. The
difference between the two treated groups is the intensity of treatment: in group (i)
the wall creates physical isolation from the West Bank which is not present in group
(ii). Palestinians in villages located equally close to the border but where the wall
is not yet built represent a control group that allows us to measure the impact of
the initiative on Palestinians affected by the wall.
We collect original micro-level data on individual preferences from people in
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treatment and control villages. We undertake incentivized decision tasks (using real
money) that reveal information on individual risk, uncertainty and time preferences.
The use of incentivized decision-tasks has two key advantages. First, they provide
incentive-compatible tools for people to reveal their true preference traits. This
makes the measurement more reliable relative to self-reported attitudes elicited in
survey-type questions. Second, because every subject faces the same constraints
and incentives in the tasks, they help overcome the challenges of isolating changes in
preferences from other confounding factors, such as information, costs and resource
constraints, which one has to face when focusing on behavioral outcomes or opinions,
such as participation in protests and forms of political activism.
Our results show that individuals close to the wall are more risk tolerant, am-
biguity averse and impatient compared to the unexposed controls living in villages
without the wall. The impact on preferences is larger for those in isolated villages,
indicating an impact on preferences that increases with the intensity of the physi-
cal constraints the wall imposes. We show that these changes are associated with
the emotional response to the policy in accordance with social psychology theories:
exposure to the wall invokes anger which leads to greater risk tolerance and im-
patience. A taste for risk and myopia is likely to increase the valuation of gains
achieved by aggressive actions. Indeed, observational data from survey polls tends
to support this argument, since the same population in which we observe changes
in preferences also show more support for armed action against Israel.
As the first to study the impact of deterrence on preferences, this paper makes
three contributions to the existing scholarly debate. First, by directly testing the
effect on preferences (rather than behavior), we provide a possible new explana-
tion for the existence of “rational” conflict traps. Retaliatory violence may persist
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if preferences change in a way that favours the valuation of perceived gains from
attacking. Uncovering the effect on preferences is also important to understand be-
havior in conflict resolution and negotiations of peace agreements. Peace treaties
involve immediate costs and later benefits. If people become more concerned with
the present, then this changes the set of acceptable trade-offs between present and
future costs and benefits. This may reduce the acceptable range of proposals based
on the individual analysis of costs and benefits. Similarly, increases in aversion to
uncertainty (ambiguity aversion) may influence the willingness to engage in nego-
tiations, which have inherently uncertain outcomes. Ambiguity aversion also tends
to reduce trust, leading to negative expectations about the future behaviour of oth-
ers (Li, Turmunkh and Wakker, 2019; Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013). In the
context of conflict, a lack of trust may perpetuate the cycle of violence by prompting
defensive behaviour as retaliation or pre-emptive violent acts to deter the opponent.5
Secondly, to our knowledge, our work is a first in providing causal and field evi-
dence in support for recent theoretical work of counter-terrorism arguing that tough
policies have an undesirable provocation effect, alongside their deterrence (Dietrich,
2014; Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004). The efficacy of tough policies depends on the
trade-off between deterrence and provocation. Our evidence on changing prefer-
ences and anecdotal evidence on increased support for armed action show empirical
support for the role of provocation via a change in preferences.
Third, we link the rational choice theory with insights from the social psychology
5While this study is the first to look at the impact of deterrence policies on preferences, there
are a few other studies that analyze the impact of very different exogenous events on preferences.
The events analyzed include (a) natural disasters (Cassar, Healy and Von Kessler, 2017; Cameron
and Shah, 2015); b) victimization (Moya, 2018; Kim and Lee, 2014); (c) distress from sudden
financial hardship (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Cohn et al., 2014); (d) exposure to violence from
an enemy during war (Voors et al., 2012). These studies bring evidence of different impacts on
preferences. In section 6 we propose a theoretical conjecture that may reconcile the apparently
conflicting results of the existing body of evidence.
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literature to provide a framework with which to interpret the possible unexpected
effects of deterrent policies. In particular, we highlight the importance of the role
of emotions in changing the calculations of net gains from action: we show that a
deterrent-policy which generates anger and resentment in the affected population
produces changes in preferences in accordance with the social psychology theories of
Reactance (Brehm and Brehm, 1981) and Appraisal Tendency Framework (Lerner
and Keltner, 2000).6 These changes may be detrimental for the relationship between
the two countries.
1 Background to the wall in the West Bank
The wall in the Palestinian territories is the most visible sign of the protracted
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Following a series of suicide attacks on Israeli citizens
during the Second Intifada, in 2002 the Israeli government began the construction
of the ‘barrier’, a wall separating the West Bank from the State of Israel. The
official rational to erect the wall is one of deterrence: preventing Palestinians without
permits from entering Israel through open areas. The wall was built within the
Palestinian territories of the West Bank, i.e. east of the 1949 Armistice Line (the
Green Line) that divides the Israeli administration from that of the Palestinian
territories. As a result, a number of communities (approximately 9,000 West Bank
Palestinians at the time of the study) became cut off from the West Bank mainland
and are de facto isolated between the Green Line and the wall (i.e. on the west side of
6Our findings on the importance of the role of emotions resonate with the focus of study by
Callen et al. (2014) who analyze the effect of recollection of fearful events on risk preferences
among Afghans. However, they use an ad-hoc design (which is discussed in Vieider (2018)) and
no emotional recollection of anger, thus it is difficult to draw comparisons between our studies.
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the wall, loosely speaking on the ‘Israeli side’ of the wall).7 The Green Line is shown
on the map in Figure B.1 (in Supplementary Material) by the black line and the
wall’s route is shown by the solid red line. Certain segments of the wall stray as much
as 5km inland from the Green Line. These ‘enclave’ areas between the Green Line
and the wall are considered military zones and their Palestinian residents are subject
to a number of movement restrictions. They are prohibited to enter Israel, although
they reside on the ‘Israeli side’ of the wall, and must pass through checkpoints
along the wall and undergo often lengthy security checks to reach services, such as
medical care, markets and schools, located in the West Bank mainland, east of the
wall. Access to these communities is prohibited to any Palestinian who resides in
the West Bank mainland. For these reasons, these communities between the Green
Line and the wall are de facto isolated from the West Bank interior.
The restrictions on movement harm Palestinians on both sides of the wall: for
businesses in the enclaves, the checkpoints increase transport costs, reduce oppor-
tunities to market their products in the West Bank and reduce the supply of inputs
and materials coming from the West Bank. For Palestinians landowners in the
West Bank mainland, the restrictions of movement to the enclaves impede access
to, and use of, farmland located between the Green Line and the wall. According to
B’Tselem, 10 percent of the cultivated farmland of the West Bank is isolated in the
enclaves (B’Tselem, 2012; World Bank, 2008). A number of reports from interna-
tional organizations testify to how the wall has significantly affected people’s lives
in otherwise very similar communities and livelihoods. (OCHA, 2009a,b, 2011).
At the time of the study (July-October 2012), not all segments of the wall have
7The term ‘West Bank Palestinians’ refers to Palestinians with a West Bank ID, rather than
Palestinians with Israeli passports or Jerusalem IDs, who are subject to the Israeli authority and
enjoy different freedom of mobility.
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been built. There are areas nearby the Green Line which remain without wall. This
is the case in some bordering areas in the southern part of the West Bank (south
of Jerusalem), where there exist Palestinian communities in close proximity to the
Green Line that do not have first-hand experience of the wall (see Figure B.1).8
Israeli newspapers, B’Tselem and personal interviews with the authors evidenced
that the construction of the wall was planned in these areas similarly to the other
areas but that eventually did not materialize. It is documented that financial issues
constrained the completion of these segments of the wall despite Israel security
apparatus stating that the construction of the wall in that area was “a vital security
need”.9 The area also comprises historic sites (e.g. the ruins of the city of Betar, the
last bastion of the Bar Kochba rebellion against the Romans) and iconic agricultural
terraces which were recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site in 2014. At
the time of the data collection, there was a pending legal case brought forward by the
Israeli Nature and Parks Authority, and other Israeli and Palestinian organizations
(separately, of course), to preserve the environmental and cultural heritage of the
historical sites. The outcome of the legal case – which froze the planned construction
8The distance of these communities which are not exposed to the wall is comparable to the
distance from the Green Line of other communities where the wall does exist.
9In reference to the segments of the wall in the control areas, an article in the Guardian
on 11th May 2011 writes “A defence ministry document, revealed by Army Radio, says work
near a group of settlements known as Gush Etzion [control area] has been frozen but is ex-
pected to resume at the end of next year [2012].” “Army Radio quoted the defence ministry
document as saying Israel ‘realises the importance of erecting the fence and retains all of the
claims to its construction despite a lack of funding’. The cost of the barrier is thought to have
risen considerably since it was estimated to be about USD 3.5bn (GBP 2.1bn) five years ago.”
https : //www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/11/israel − west − bank − barrier On an-
other article, Haaretz 4th January 2015 https : //www.haaretz.com/.premium − palestinians −
israelis− laud− s− court−decision− 1.5356139, while reporting about contradictory statements
by the Ministry of Defence at the time, evidenced that Israel’s long-held position was that security
needs were equally high in the area. The article writes: “[The Israeli High Court President] Grunis
wrote, ‘Inasmuch as the state contended throughout the various stages of proceedings that there
was a vital security need to construct the barrier along a route next to Battir [one of the control
villages], at this point the defense minister position is that building the separation barrier along
this route (while stressing its security importance) is not of a priority that would justify building
it at this time’ [January 2015].”
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– arrived only in January 2015 (well after the end of data collection) and until
that point the exact location of the wall and its timing remained uncertain to the
Palestinian residents of those areas.10 The wall’s projected route (as it is conjectured
by international organizations as no official map exists) is shown by the dotted red
line in map B.1 (OCHA, 2011).
Based on their location with respect to the wall, we label these three groups of
localities as follows: group (i) exposed to and isolated from the West Bank mainland
by the wall (they are located between the Green Line and the wall); group (ii)
exposed to and not isolated from the mainland and group (iii) without wall (but
similarly close the Green Line). Qualitative and quantitative evidence indicates
that the wall’s route appears unrelated to Palestinian characteristics and there is no
evidence of selection bias due to individual differences prior to the building of the
wall. We present this evidence in detail in Section 4.
2 The wall and preference change
The objective of this study is to test whether the imposition of the barrier wall
can affect the way in which people make decisions by changing their underlying
preferences for risk, ambiguity and time delay. The wall can be conceived of as a
repressive initiative and a deterrent policy. We argue that the wall induces more
risk tolerant, ambiguity averse and impatient preferences, which could undermine
10In an article on 18 October 2012 for example Haaretz writes: “The Israeli security apparatus
says that work on the wall in the Battir area [control area] has been calculated to cause the
least damage possible to the landscape; it says that the wall is of a minimal width and that its
route has been changed and moved to the bottom of the slopes in order to minimize damage
to the agricultural landscape, even taking into account the security risk, since placement of the
wall at the top of a hill allows for better control of an area. The only areas to suffer damage,
Israel says, are the bottom terraces, but water will continue to flow to the farmed sections.”
https : //www.haaretz.com/.premium−j−lem−ecosystem−up−against−the−wall−1.5193375
11
the deterrent effect of the wall. Our analysis offers empirical evidence to accompany
anecdotal (e.g. Collier et al., 2003; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) and theoretical
(e.g. Dietrich, 2014; Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004) claims that deterrence may lead
to resistance via preference change. More generally, however, our analysis adds a
new dimension to the economic literature on endogenous preferences and the numer-
ous potential sources of this endogeneity. One strand shows how preferences change
as a consequence of evolutionary processes. Direct evolutionary approaches empha-
sise how agents with fixed strategies or preferences become more or less prevalent
in the population as a result of long-term biological equilibria, which reflect the
inheritance of successful genetic traits (see (Robson and Samuelson, 2011) for a
review).11 Alternatively, indirect evolutionary approaches assume agents do not
have fixed strategies, and react rationally to their environment, adapting strate-
gies to maximise their ‘fitness’ (Güth and Yaari, 1992; Huck and Oechssler, 1999).
Building on these evolutionary perspectives are several works analysing the cultural
transmission of norms and preferences (see Bowles (1998) for a review). This trans-
mission is argued to be influenced by the structure of economic institutions such as
markets, and affected by prevailing learning rules such as imitation or conformism.
A further line of enquiry focusses on the impact of traumatic life events on specific
preference traits, like time and risk preferences. Here, preferences are argued to be
endogenous to experiencing events like war violence (e.g Voors et al., 2012; Callen
et al., 2014), victimization (Kim and Lee, 2014), natural disasters (Cassar, Healy
and Von Kessler, 2017; Cameron and Shah, 2015), or even abrupt economic events
(Cohn et al., 2014; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011).
11The analysis of aggregate equilibrium preference traits, like the social discount rate is often
the focus of this literature (see e.g. Robson and Szentes (2014) and Sozou (2009)).
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Our research therefore contributes to the economic literature on endogenous pref-
erence change, particularly that part concerned with the impact of abrupt events,
shocks, on specific preferences. The chief difference in our work is that the abrupt
changes in question are policy driven, and hence closer in spirit to the role of insti-
tutional factors in determining preferences discussed in Bowles (1998). Importantly
though, in common with the evidence on traumatic life events, reactions to the wall
were emotionally-charged, and the emotional response may have some bearing on
the direction of preference change. The theoretical connections between emotions,
like anger and fear, preference change and behaviour are predominantly studied in
social psychology. The most widely cited conceptualization of effects of emotions
on decision making, which is highly relevant to the case in hand, is known as the
Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF, originally developed by Lerner and Kelt-
ner (2000, 2001) and extended more recently by Cohen-Chen, Crisp and Halperin
(2017)). ATF argues that people respond emotionally to specific events depending
on how they ‘appraise’ them. Different emotions are associated with particular di-
mensions of ‘appraisal’ and each emotion is related to the emergence of a specific
action ‘tendency’.1213 Consequently, informed by the ATF, our questionnaire was
12These appraisal dimensions include pleasantness, anticipated effort, attentional activity, cer-
tainty, perceived obstacles, responsibility attribution (intentionality) and relative strength (con-
trollability). As an example of the ‘appraisal’-‘action tendency’ nexus, anger’s core appraisal
dimensions are intentionality, a desire for control, and a desire to correct the perceived wrongdo-
ing. When one experiences an event and appraises it as unpleasant or unjust, or one in which
responsibility is attributed to another person or group and there is a desire to push back, feelings
of anger are more likely to arise as the dominant emotional experience. Anger is a hot state and
activates an ‘action tendency’ towards more risk taking, impulsivity, pushing back and a tendency
to see things in extremes (so called ‘black and white’ thinking). These action tendencies corre-
spond with anger’s core appraisal dimensions. In contrast, fear’s core appraisal dimensions are
uncertainty, low control and low intentionality. Accordingly, these appraisal dimensions generate
an action tendency towards aversion to risks, cautious strategies and the desire to create a safer
environment.
13The effect of anger in the context of initiatives that diminish freedom, like physical barriers
and laws, and are perceived unjust, is also elaborated in the earlier theory of Reactance (Brehm
and Brehm, 1981; Miron and Brehm, 2006).
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designed to elicit the respondents’ recollections of the emotions they felt at the mo-
ment they found out the wall had been built. Notwithstanding the limitations of a
self-reported measure of emotions, Table B.1 in the Supplementary Material shows
that subjects exposed to the wall report levels of anger that are significantly higher
than subjects without the wall. The feeling of anger and reactance is also apparent
from the answers to open-ended qualitative questions. In the results section (Section
5) we discuss how the observed differences in emotions and preferences accord with
the ATF. We conclude that the ATF offers a potentially fruitful lens through which
to interpret not only our results, but also the previous evidence of the effects of a
broader set of significant life events on preferences.
3 Research Design and Data
In this section we describe the research design tailored to test the hypotheses that
the wall has changed individual preferences for risk, ambiguity and time discounting
relative to the people not affected.14 We first describe the sampling frame of our data
collection and then present the incentivized decision tasks used to elicit preferences
and their implementation, followed by a brief discussion of the accompanying survey
data we collected. Additional implementation details are described in the Online
Supplementary Material, section B.
14We analyze the three preferences separately because there is no theoretical reason why risk
and ambiguity preferences, and time and ambiguity preferences are correlated Levy et al. (2010).
However, time and risk preferences could well be correlated and we will control for this correlation
in regressions. Relaxing the assumption of independent equations by estimating a Simultaneous
Equation Model does not change the results (see Table D.15 in Supplementary Material, D).
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3.1 Sampling Frame
There are two noteworthy elements of the sampling frame. First, the wall affects
people on either side but with different intensity: people living between the Green
Line and the wall face severe mobility restrictions, they are in a ‘military zone’ cut
off from the mainland. These residents live within a state of uncertainty, since the
status of these ‘enclaves’ areas in the face of any peace settlement is dubious. Thus,
the practical implications for this group are more severe and hence the exposure
to the ‘treatment’ is more intense. Our sampling frame reflects these two levels of
intensity of treatment. We randomly selected villages from three mutually exclusive
groups (see Map B.1):
(i)— villages between the Green Line and the wall that are close to the wall
and isolated from the West Bank mainland. This group has a higher intensity of
treatment since residents are both exposed to and isolated by the wall (Thigh);
(ii)— villages that are similarly close to the wall but located in the mainland.
This group has a lower intensity of treatment compared to group (i) since residents
are exposed to the wall but not isolated by it (Tlow);
(iii)— villages located near the Green Line in areas without wall (not exposed
and not isolated). This group serves as control group (C).
Secondly, the sampling frame includes only villages within 5km either side of the
wall (5km being approximately the maximum distance the wall enters the West Bank
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inland). This is because given the nature of the conflict in this part of the world, it
is possible that preferences differ between Palestinians located at the frontier of the
West Bank, near the wall, and those far from the frontier. Hence, sampled villages
are approximately equally close to Israel.
We randomly selected 5 villages from group (i) in three geographical areas
(North, Centre and South of the West Bank, see Map B.1)15; 7 villages (of compa-
rable population size) from group (ii) and 4 control villages from group (iii) located
on either side of the proposed route of the segment of wall that is not built yet.
Table 1 summarises the design.










the wall and the
Green Line)
(i, Thigh) Yes Yes isolated and exposed
(ii, Tlow) No Yes not isolated, exposed
(iii, C) No No not exposed, not isolated
3.2 Experimental Tasks and Survey Data
To measure preferences for risk, ambiguity and time preferences we implement de-
cision tasks, incentivized with real monetary payoffs. Using tasks with real payoffs
presents subjects with clear and equal incentives and allows us to elicit the under-
lying preferences by observing subject behavior in a controlled setting. We selected
tasks and followed protocols that are well-established in the experimental literature
15We exclude East Jerusalem because the city is under Israeli authority.
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in order to elicit individual preferences (L’Haridon and Vieider, 2017).
Task 1: Risk preferences.— We elicit risk preferences (in the gain domain) us-
ing an adaptation of the well-established task developed by Holt and Laury (2002)
and used in a predominantly Muslim country by Callen et al. (2014). The task is
presented in Table 2. Subjects make a series of eleven pair-wise choices between
a safe option A, involving a sure payment of NIS 30 (approximately $8.5), and a
relatively risky option B, consisting of a series of gambles over NIS 90 ($25.5) and 0
with winning probability increasing from zero to 1. As we go down the list, option
B becomes more attractive and at some point the difference between the expected
value of option A and option B changes from positive to negative. The point at
which a subject switches from preferring option A to option B carries information
on his certainty equivalent (that is, the level of risk that makes a subject indifferent
between the safe and risky option). We use this information as a (nonparametric)
measure of risk aversion.16 At the end of the task, one situation is randomly selected
and paid out to participants according to their choice. Since any choice may count
for payment, subjects are incentivized to respond truthfully to any situation. All
subjects are paid.
16For example, looking at Table 2, we expect a risk-neutral subject to prefer option A in row
3 and to prefer option B in row 4. Subjects who switch from option A to B in earlier rows can
be categorized as risk-tolerant and subjects who switch from option A to B in later rows can be
categorized as risk-averse.
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Table 2: Risk preference task
OPTION A OPTION B E(A) −E(B)
Sure payment of 30 NIS Urn draw: a white ball drawn gives 90 NIS
0 30 NIS Urn with 0 white balls, 10 black balls 30
1 30 NIS Urn with 1 white ball , 9 black balls 21
2 30 NIS Urn with 2 white balls, 8 black balls 12
3 30 NIS Urn with 3 white balls, 7 black balls 3
4 30 NIS Urn with 4 white balls, 6 black balls -6
5 30 NIS Urn with 5 white balls, 5 black balls -15
6 30 NIS Urn with 6 white balls, 4 black balls -24
7 30 NIS Urn with 7 white balls, 3 black balls -33
8 30 NIS Urn with 8 white balls, 2 black balls -42
9 30 NIS Urn with 9 white balls, 1 black balls -51
10 30 NIS Urn with 10 white balls, 0 black balls -60
Based on the subjects’ choices, we classify subjects as follows: risk − neutral
decision-makers prefer option A over B in rows 1-3 and option B over A in rows
4-10; risk − seeking decision-makers prefer option B over A from any row < 3;
risk−averse decision-makers prefer option B over A from any row > 4. Subjects
who prefer option B over A in row 0 and those who switch more than once
between options are considered inconsistent with rationality and excluded from
the analysis.
Task 2: Ambiguity preferences.— We elicit ambiguity preferences by adopting a
simple task based on the original Ellsberg’s two urn thought-experiment and used
with non-student subjects in Lauriola and Levin (2001). The task is described in
Table 3. Subjects make pair-wise choices between two urns, each containing 10 balls
of two colours, one of which carries a prize of NIS 30. In one urn the number of
winning balls is known to the subject (this is a risky urn) and this number increases
from zero to 10 as the list proceeds. The other urn has a fixed but unknown compo-
sition (this is an ambiguous urn). The point at which the subject switches from the
‘ambiguous’ urn to the ‘risky’ urn carries information on his risk equivalent, i.e. the
known probability of a risky lottery that makes the subject indifferent between the
risky and the ambiguous act, and hence his degree of ambiguity aversion. Looking
at Table 3, an ambiguity neutral subject is expected to be indifferent between the
two urns in row 6; ambiguity averse subjects would switch to the ‘risky’ urn in ear-
lier rows and ambiguity lovers in later rows. At the end of the task, one situation
is selected at random and played for real money according to the subject’s choice.
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All subjects are paid. Among tasks eliciting the degree of ambiguity aversion, the
task it is easy to understand relative to alternatives found in the literature (see
Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2013) for extensive reviews). This was an important
consideration given the field nature of the study, and the task proved accessible in
the pilot phase.17
Table 3: Ambiguity preference task
URN A URN B Classification
Risky Urn Ambiguous Urn
1 Urn with 0 white balls, 10 black balls ?
2 Urn with 1 white ball , 9 black balls ? Ambiguity
3 Urn with 2 white balls, 8 black balls ? averse
4 Urn with 3 white balls, 7 black balls ?
5 Urn with 4 white balls, 6 black balls ?
6 Urn with 5 white balls, 5 black balls ?
7 Urn with 6 white balls, 4 black balls ?
8 Urn with 7 white balls, 3 black balls ?
9 Urn with 8 white balls, 2 black balls ? Ambiguity
10 Urn with 9 white balls, 1 black balls ? loving
11 Urn with 10 white balls, 0 black balls ?
Based on the subjects’ choices, we classify subjects as follows: ambiguity−neutral
decision-makers prefer option B over A in rows 1-5 and prefer option A over B
in rows 6-11 or prefer option B over A in rows 1-6 and option A over B in rows
7-11; ambiguity − loving decision-makers prefer option A over B from any row
≥ 8; ambiguity− averse decision-makers prefer option A over B from any row ≤
5. Subjects who prefer option A over B in row 1, option B over A in row 11 and
those who switch more than once between options are excluded from the analysis.
Task 3: Time preferences.— We elicit time preferences with two tasks consisting
of two sets of six-pairwise choices between two options: receiving 200 NIS in a
month’s time (option A) or NIS 200(1+d)t at a later time (option B), where d –
the discount rate– increases from 0.1 to 0.35. The tasks are described in Table 4.
Where a subject switches from option A to option B carries interval information on
17While beliefs about the urn composition may influence the levels of ambiguity preferences,
we are comparing differences across treatment groups. There was no reason to think that beliefs
about the urn’s composition were systematically different across treatment areas. With beliefs
orthogonal to treatment, and in an effort to keep participant time at a minimum, we did not elicit
beliefs. We did however elicit subjective expectations about the future to test for confounders.
These tests support this assertion and are described in Supplementary Material, section D.
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his discount rate: the earlier he switches to option B, the more patient he is. Since
the time horizon under consideration may matter for discounting, we consider two
time horizons and define the delayed time at 2 months in the first and 7 months
in the second.18 Because future money is less certain than instantaneous money,
we provide two future options to hold transaction costs of delayed options constant
(Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002).19
Because of budgetary considerations, in this task we adopt a payoff scheme
whereby one single subject per locality is chosen at random to be paid his preferred
option from one, randomly selected, choice alternative. Subjects received a certifi-
cate, they were told that payments were guaranteed by the University of London, in
collaboration with a well-known local research institute, and given contact details
of the researchers.20
18Non-constant, hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting, in which people use different dis-
count rates for different time horizons, is a common empirical finding in behavioral economics.
19The nature of the task yields a truncated distribution of discount rates bounded at 0.35. In
the course of the field experiments, we received extra funding and were able to extend the list of
options between delayed amounts from 6 to 10 pairwise choices in two communities in order to
relax the upper bound of the elicited discount rates. We consider various ways to deal empirically
with this task’s modification. Section 5 presents the more conservative results estimated on the
restricted sample of people answering the short (6-)pairwise choice task. Estimation using data on
the entire sample, controlling for the type of task answered, makes no difference to the conclusions
and results are presented in Table D.3.
20The selected payoff scheme retains the incentive compatibility and transparency since most
localities are small and respondents are likely to know who is selected for payment and received
the money.
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Table 4: Time preference task
OPTION A: OPTION B:
pays amount below pays amount below







OPTION A: OPTION B:
pays amount below in pays amount below in







Implementation.— We conducted our field experiments in July 2012 and Oc-
tober 2012. The experimental tasks were presented in fixed order as part of a
short-questionnaire, covering socio-economic characteristics, personal attitudes and
experiences. The average payment per participant was NIS 71, approximately equiv-
alent to the median daily wage in the West Bank (Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics, 2012).21 We administered the survey to 258 participants who were ran-
domly selected and interviewed at their home by female enumerators, in keeping
with Palestinian gender norms.
The study aims to test for changes in preferences, without any priming at the
time the decision tasks were undertaken. For this reason, the experimental instruc-
tions were deliberately anodyne, and made no mention of the wall. In light of the
possible sensitivity of questions involving risk in a predominantly Muslim popula-
tion, in explaining the tasks, we intentionally used wordings similar to Callen et al.
21Statistics are available on www.pcbs.gov.ps
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(2014) who administered a similar risk task in Afghanistan, a much more conserva-
tive Muslim society. All interviews started with a consent script.
The percentage of subjects who switched from one option to another more than
once in our tasks, or showed other irrational behaviors, is approximately 8%, which
is in line with similar field experiments (Callen et al., 2014). We exclude those
subjects from the analysis. Table D.11 (in Supplementary Material) shows that this
attrition is not systematically related to the treatment status. Further details on
implementation are provided in the Supplementary Material (e.g. interviewer train-
ing, instruction, incentives).
Survey data.— As part of the interview, participants completed a short ques-
tionnaire covering socio-economic information and past experiences, including ex-
periences of conflict. We also undertook a second survey in which we contacted all
original participants and invited them to take part in a telephone interview. The
survey included questions recollecting the emotions felt at the time of the discovery
of the building of the wall (or its planning, for people in locality without wall).22 In
addition, it included questions related to life expectancy and expectations in various
domains of life.
76% of the original sample completed the telephone survey. Table B.2 shows that
the attrition is not related to exposure to the wall. Importantly, we find no important
22The data on emotions are recall data relating to the time when the wall was built, not the
emotional states during the decision tasks. These data were collected as part of a post-experiment
survey and therefore presented no emotional priming for participants. Neither was there any
priming related to the wall. Consent forms and experimental instructions made no mention of the
wall or the subject’s location with respect to it. As further explained in Section 3, the decision
tasks were collected in 2012, 10 years after the wall was constructed. For these reasons, the
implementation of the decision task is very unlikely to have induced any emotional state such that
the observed differences in responses could be interpreted as a temporary, short-lived, phenomenon.
Rather, the experiments reveal more fundamental attitudinal traits, and the differences across
groups reflect persistent change.
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variation in the occurrence of shocks in the period between the experiments and the
follow-up survey, increasing confidence that we are not picking up unrepresentative
responses influenced by recent experiences.
4 Causality, Exogeneity and Selection Bias
In order to identify a causal effect of exposure to the wall on preferences it must be
the case that the route taken by the wall is exogenous with respect to individual
preferences of Palestinians. Exogeneity in this context has several requirements.
First, the wall must not be located so as to spatially separate people with particular
preferences (more or less risk averse for instance). A comparison of treatment and
control groups would capture pre-existing differences if this were the case. Second,
the wall must not induce relocation of people either in anticipation of, or in response
to, the wall being built. Thirdly, secular trends in migration must not differ between
the treatment and control groups. Differing relocation decisions or migration trends
in general could mean that the comparison of treatment and control groups would
capture the changing composition of these groups, rather than the object of interest:
changing preferences. In the remainder of this section we provide qualitative and
quantitative evidence to show that these different dimensions of selection bias are
not a threat to exogeneity and the wall can be treated as a natural experiment for
our purposes. Quantitative evidence comes from analysis of census data from the
entire sampling frame in the period before the wall was built from 1997 to 2002, and
from the period after the wall was built from 2002 to 2007.23
In relation to the exogeneity of the wall, we do not need to argue that the deci-
23Details of the analysis are presented in section C of the Supplementary Material.
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sion to build the wall is exogenous, we need only argue that the route taken by the
wall is exogenous. In this regard, the qualitative evidence strongly suggest that the
reasons behind the wall’s precise path are unrelated to socio-economic characteris-
tics of the Palestinian population. Official transcripts from the Israeli High Court
of Justice state that “operational considerations were the main considerations in
selecting the barrier’s route” (based on the state’s response in Israel’s High Court
of Justice, case HCJ 7784/02, sec.18). The main reasons for selecting the barrier’s
route include exogenous considerations, such as topography and Israeli settlement
inclusion24. Discoveries of antiquities caused accidental modifications to the planned
route so that excavations could take place on the Israeli side of the wall (such as
in Tulkarem district, HCJ 7784/02, sec.30). In other instances, the wall’s route
was diverted to satisfy political pressure from Israeli citizens.25 The quantitative
evidence from the Census also supports exogeneity. To test for selection bias due
to pre-existing differences, we use the individual data from the Population, Housing
and Establishment Census 1997, collected prior to the wall construction. Hence,
we observe the entire population. The census data provides us with a broad set of
socio-economic and background characteristics that are associated with risk, ambi-
24However, there are settlements either side of the wall and in approximately equal numbers.
For example, the Northern enclave has 3 settlements, and there are 2 settlements inland within 5km
from the wall. In the enclave near Qalqilya there are 7 settlements, and 6 inland within 5km from
the wall. There is no evidence that the wall was built around more densely populated settlements,
in fact close by the initial segments along the northern border there are less populated settlements
than the control areas. It must be noted that settlements within the 5km radius from the wall
are quite old settlements, built between 17-21 years prior to the wall construction. Similarly, the
settlements in the control localities were built on average 23 years prior to the wall construction.
Individual data on expected violence from settlers does not differ either side of the wall.
25For example, in the Qalqilya district, the wall is built in a way that separates small communi-
ties, such as Habla and Ras ‘Atyia, from the nearest main town of Qalqilya, a few hundred meters
north, upon which the smaller communities are dependent for markets and services. The decision
driving the wall’s route followed a petition from the residents of a nearby Israeli town, Matan, who
wanted to maintain access to Road n.55. (“The Battle against the large Qalqilya”, Ha’aretz, 27
August 2002).
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guity and time preferences (e.g. age, gender, education, marital status, household
size and composition). We looked for evidence that would suggest that communities
now isolated between the Green Line and the wall, i.e. group (i), were different
from communities in group (ii), those now living nearby the wall on the east side of
the wall (exposed, not-isolated), and from communities in group (iii), those living
in areas without the wall (not-exposed, not-isolated). The last 3 columns of Table
C.1 in the Supplementary Material reports the test of mean differences between the
treatment groups using the Cohen’s d standardized effect-size statistic.26 The results
show that the large majority of the Cohen’s d effect-size statistics are well below 0.2,
indicating that the differences between treatment and control areas are of a trivial
magnitude. This is evidence that the wall did not follow a route that separated
groups with pre-existing differences. Relatedly, other studies on militancy do not
support the idea that the starting point of the wall or its route was determined by
the presence of militants at the frontier or particular geographical areas (Benmelech,
Berrebi and Klor (2012), Figure 1 p.115) nor that, during the wall construction, the
length of the wall was correlated with the intensity of suicide attacks towards Israelis
(Jaeger and Paserman (2009), Table 8, p.338). Such findings are a strong indication
that the path of the wall is essentially exogenous to the outcomes of interest in this
study.
Evidence suggests that relocation in anticipation of the wall is unlikely since
people could not anticipate the wall’s exact location. Reports from B’Tselem, an
Israeli Human Rights Organization, suggest that the communication of the wall’s
26Standardized effect size statistics are more informative than a simple t-test in large samples,
like the census: the t-test, which depends on the sample size, may show very small difference
of no practical relevance as statistically significant. Cohen’s statistics of 0.2 (in absolute value)
are considered a ‘small’ effect size indicating minor differences, far from practical significance.
Specifically, for groups 1 and 2, the Cohen’s d effect-size measures the standardized difference in
means: (µ1 − µ2)/σ, where σ is the pooled sample standard deviation.
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route was unclear and Palestinians could not have been aware of its exact path.
B’Tselem reports that, in response to a request of a map of the wall in the early
time of construction, a spokesperson of the Ministry of Defence responded that the
“publication of the map has not been authorized” and that “information cannot
be provided other than what has appeared in the media” (B’Tselem, 2003). The
same report provides evidence that the construction of the wall began along paths
that were not included in the original decision approved by the Israel’s government
committee in charge of the plan.27 Relocation in response to the wall would also
have been beset by institutional hurdles. The residence permit regime in place in
isolated areas is such that only residents with a permit can live in isolated areas,
hence residents would lose their permit if they moved away. For this reason, mobility
is likely to have been very low in these areas, something that is strongly supported
by the quantitative evidence.
In order to quantitatively evaluate the claims of low mobility both in anticipation
of, and in response to the wall, we return to the Population, Housing and Establish-
ment Census 2007. The 2007 Census has information about the respondent’s current
locality of residence, how long she has been living there, their previous locality if she
moved, and the reason for changing residence. Of the population reporting to have
changed place of residence (about 20% of the population), the median residence
duration is 10 years, and only 33% of migrants moved to their current location
between the start of the wall construction and the date of the 2007 Census (i.e.
between 2002-2007). The median residence duration of the 67% who moved before
27For instance, “In January 2003, the Ministry of Defence began infrastructure work along an
additional forty-five kilometer stretch of the barrier, from Sallem eastward to Faqu’a [two towns
in the Northern border of the West Bank], that was not included in the Cabinet’s [the Ministerial
Committee for Security Matter] decision of August 2002 [the decision approving the first section
of the route].” (B’Tselem, 2003).
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the wall was built is 15 years, so the vast majority of migrants moved to their cur-
rent location many years before the construction of the wall began. Moreover, of
all migrants, only 0.1% report to have moved because of the wall.28 According to
individual Census responses on migration timing and motivation, it is unlikely that
migration was either in anticipation of, or in response to, the building of the wall.
However, it could be that the migration responses to the wall manifest themselves
in some other reported motivation. According to the Census 2007 the two main
reasons for migration are for marriage (25% of migrants) and to return to the location
of origin (e.g. after a period of working elsewhere, 24%).29 However, if the wall
induced changes in the timing of these decisions, e.g. earlier marriage and return
home, differences would appear in the age of marriage and the age of return to
town of origin for those emigrating from the areas affected by the wall for these
reasons. We calculate the age of marriage using the Census 2007 data by subtracting
duration of residence from current age for the subset who indicate marriage as the
reason for migration. We do the same for the returning home decision. Even in
this already small subset of population we find no significant differences in age of
marriage across the sampling frames for treatment and control groups (see Table
C.3 in the Supplementary Material). Relatedly, there are no significant differences
in the age composition and population density (see Table C.1).
Turning to the general trends in migration, large migratory flows might also affect
the composition of both the area of origin (e.g. by purging areas of origin of risk-
28A small share of the migrant population reports having moved residence because of ‘Israeli
measures’(3% of migrants), which may possibly include measures such as the wall. However, an
extremely small fraction of these 3% of people come from ‘isolated and exposed’ localities (0.1%)
or ‘not-exposed’ localities (0.5%); hence, this response is unlikely to have anything to do with the
wall.
29Returning to the town of origin reflects the profound attachment in the Palestinian culture
to the family’s place of origin and the family’s land, and is a strong component of identity.
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averse people) and the area of destination (e.g. inflow of a certain type of people).
To evaluate this possibility, we coded all the localities of provenance to investigate
where people came from and where they moved to in the period after the wall
construction (2002-2007) and in the 5 years preceding the wall construction (1997-
2001). The fraction of emigrants relative to the population of their treatment area of
origin is at most 1.1% in the period preceding the wall, and fairly similar across areas
(see Table C.2). In the post wall period (2002-2007) the figure is at most 2.8%, and
again fairly similar across areas. The fractions of immigrants from each treatment
area into other treatment areas are minor, being at most 1.4% and 5.1% in the pre-
and post wall periods. These fractions are too small to suggest significant changes in
the composition of the population of areas of origin and destination. This conclusion
is supported by direct tests of the composition of the populations in terms of age
and population density, neither of which differ significantly across the treatment and
control populations (See Figure C.1 in the Supplementary Material).30
The evidence suggests that migration has not been induced by the wall, and is
in any event so minor as to have no effect on the composition of the populations
in our survey areas. This accords with the fact that, at its core, the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict is a conflict over land: attachment to the land is deep-rooted and
physical presence over the land is paramount. The general evidence of the rather
immobile population is also reflected in our survey data. In our subject sample,
the average residence duration among those who reported being born outside their
30A regression of community population growth rates on dummy indicators for communities in
group (i) and (ii) yields insignificant coefficients (p-values 0.718 and 0.862, respectively), suggesting
that population growth trends are comparable across treatment and control groups. We compare
changes of population density using the 1997 and 2007 Population, Housing and Establishment
Census. As expected, population density increases over time, but at comparable rates across
areas: the t-statistics on differences in population density between ‘isolated and exposed’ versus
‘not-isolated, exposed’ (t-test=0.70) and versus ‘not-exposed, not-isolated’ communities (t-test=
0.465) do not suggest any significant discrepancy.
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current locality is 22 years. There is no difference in average residence duration
depending on wall exposure (see Table C.4 in the Supplementary Material). 93.4%
of subjects lived in the sampled villages for at least 10 years, i.e. long before the
wall was constructed. We conclude that our sample is not made of recent migrants
who would have changed the composition of the treatment groups.
While the evidence we present cannot completely rule out selection on unobserv-
ables, it has been argued that the selection effect witnessed when controlling for
a large number of observable characteristics can be a good guide to the degree of
selection on unobservables (Altonji, Elder and Taber, 2005). Taken together, the
qualitative evidence on how the location of the wall was decided, the comparison of
pre- and post- wall observable characteristics from the census data, and the evidence
against systematic differences in migration patterns, all provide arguments in favour
of treating the wall as a natural experiment. Other studies provide evidence that
the wall can be considered an exogenous shock and look at criminal behavior within
the interior of the West Bank Getmansky, Grossman and Wright (2017).
5 Results
The descriptive statistics of our sample of participants by treatment area are shown
in Table B.3 in the online Supplementary Material. Socio-economic characteristics
across treatment and control groups are balanced.31
First we look at the distributions of preferences (figures in the Supplementary
Material). A majority of subjects in our sample (Figure D.1) is risk averse (57.4%).
31A minor difference is that income of isolated communities appears to be higher than not-
isolated communities (at the 10% level). In our regressions we control for income, as well as
additional control variables.
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The correlation between risk aversion, measured by the switching point in decision
task 1, and individuals’ characteristics is in line with typical results found in the
literature, e.g. Dohmen et al. (2011). 32
In terms of ambiguity preferences, we find significant ambiguity aversion in our
sample (74% of sample, Figure D.2), with a notable degree of heterogeneity. Again,
these results are in line with those elsewhere in the literature (Chakravarty and Roy,
2009; Ahn et al., 2014). The mean risk equivalent, i.e. the known probability of a
risky lottery that is considered equivalent to the ambiguous option, for the whole
sample is 0.4, significantly lower than 0.5, even-odds, expected for an ambiguity
neutral agent (p<0.001).
In terms of time preferences, the mean discount rate for the short horizon exper-
iment (payments in month 1 or 2) was approximately 21%, in line with the previous
literature.33 For the long-horizon experiment (payments in month 1 or 7) the mean
discount rate is substantially lower at 13%. This statistically significant difference
is suggestive of discount rates that vary with the time-horizon.
Our primary interest is to analyze if individual preferences are affected by the
wall, while distinguishing between two levels of treatment intensity: one treatment
is being exposed to the wall, as for treatment group (ii); a more intense treatment
is being exposed to the wall and isolated by it, as for treatment group (i). In
32Risk aversion is positively associated with female gender (0.123**), age (0.125**) and neg-
atively with education (-0.090) and income (-0.07) although not significantly. We also find the
expected correlations between risk aversion and smoking (-0.095*), self-employment (-0.012) and
behaviors in a hypothetical scenario involving risk, such as accepting an offer to go to Jerusalem
without holding a permit (-0.12**). We find significant correlations with two self-assessment ques-
tions of risk preferences, i.e. the willingness to take risk in general (-0.147**) and in financial
matters (-0.194***), in line with Dohmen et al. (2011).
33Given the way in which the payments were organized, expected rewards are (inversely) related
to the size of the group interviewed in each village. Including group size as an explanatory variable
in the regression specifications for time preferences provides a mean of checking for responses
associated with payments that were perceived to be small. The results are unaffected by including
group size.
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Table 5 we show the regressions of categorical measures of risk, ambiguity and
time preferences derived from the decision tasks on dummy indicators for treatment
communities in group (i) and (ii). The control group (iii) is the base category. If
the wall has an impact on preferences we should observe significant coefficients on
the dummy variables for group (i) and (ii). We expect group (i), which receives a
more intense treatment, to have larger differences from control communities than
group (ii). In our regressions, we include gender, age, education and income as
control variables. Standard errors are bootstrapped (clustered bootstrapping at the
community level). For robustness a series of alternative inferential methods (e.g.
randomization inference and wild-bootstrap standard errors) are presented in Table
D.14 in Supplementary Material. We present additional regressions using village-
level control variables in tables D.1-D.2.
Our chief result is that exposure to the wall affects preferences. In the domain of
risk preferences, column (1) of Table 5 shows the estimates from an OLS regression
on ‘treatment’ dummies and controls. The results show that compared to people
living in areas without the wall, people exposed to the wall have become more risk
tolerant. Furthermore, the extent of this increase in risk tolerance increases with
the intensity of exposure: communities exposed and isolated by the wall become
more risk tolerant than the other groups. An ordered probit specification leads to
qualitatively the same results.
To test the robustness of these results, we deploy a host of additional robustness
checks. The results remain robust to the inclusion of control variables, including
gender, age and its square, income and educational attainment. We also check the
robustness of the results to the inclusion of wealth (proxied by the availability of
savings), having lost private land due to the wall construction, and village level
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characteristics. These results are reported in Table D.1 in Supplementary Material.
34 We also check whether the results are being driven by changes in subjective ex-
pectations about the future, rather than changes in the preferences themselves. Our
intention is to allay concerns about the results being driven by subjective negative
economic outlooks (see Table D.13 in Supplementary Material). Again, the evidence
speaks against this alternative explanation.
We also find that the wall has affected preferences over ambiguity. The OLS
estimated coefficients are presented in column (2) of Table 5. Compared to people
without the wall, people who are exposed to the wall are generally more ambiguity
averse and this effect is larger if they are also isolated by the wall. In the case of am-
biguity preferences the regression estimates show that there is no gender or income
effect on ambiguity preferences, which is in accordance with results in the literature
(Sutter et al., 2013). Throughout the specifications, our results suggest that ambi-
guity tolerance increases with age and with education, similarly to previous evidence
(Baillon, Koellinger and Treffers, 2016). The differences in ambiguity preferences of
treatment groups compared to the control group remain robust when adding avail-
ability of savings, having lost land, and village level characteristics (Table D.2 in
Supplementary Material).
At first glance, an increase in risk tolerance conjoint with an increase in am-
biguity aversion may seem counterintuitive. Yet, such a combination of changes
is not necessarily out of the ordinary. First, risk and ambiguity are theoretically
different domains: risk describes situations with well-defined, known probabilities;
ambiguity refers to situations in which probabilities are unknown or vague. Pref-
34Throughout the results, we find a non-linear effect of age. Although not statistically significant
in multivariate specifications, simple regressions of risk preferences on gender suggest that females
are more risk averse than males, a result consonant with previous literature.
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erences over each domain can differ. For instance, one may think of situations in
which, faced with unknown likelihoods of decision consequences, a person is sensi-
tive to the lack of information and acts cautiously or even pessimistically – placing
the lowest likelihood on good outcomes, that is, behaving in an ambiguity averse
manner. However, she is willing to take on a risky decision if the likelihoods are
clear (unambiguous). More generally, the desire to avoid bad outcomes can trigger
risky actions.35 Furthermore, the shift towards more risk tolerance and ambiguity
aversion that we observe in our study does not leave people with an unusual com-
bination of preferences, either with regard to the control group36 or more generally
what is found in the literature (Borghans et al., 2009).
For time preferences, we follow the literature and estimate a (discrete time)
proportional hazard model.37 A negative coefficient is an indication of more im-
patient preferences (i.e. they are less likely to switch to the later-in-time option
in the task). Column (3) and Column (4) of Table 5 show the estimated model
for the short-time horizon and the long-time horizon, respectively. While there are
no differences in patience across groups in the short-horizon, exposure to the wall
significantly affects patience in the long-time horizon. The results show that people
belonging to the communities exposed to the wall but not-isolated are significantly
more impatient than people without the wall: their tendency to prefer the later
35Consider someone receiving an uncertain diagnosis of a rare, not well known, cancer. There
is uncertainty about the chances of survival and the individual response to treatments. A patient
may well care most about the very bad outcome: death, and make decisions on the basis that the
probability of this outcome is high (a ‘maxmin’ preference, to use ambiguity theory terminology).
She is ambiguity averse. She may then do anything to avoid the worst outcome and accept risky
medical treatments or experimental trials. That is, she may take on a risky action.
36Results are available from the authors.
37Time preferences are inferred by the transition to the later-in-time option of the task. The
later a subject makes the transition to choosing the future option, the more impatient she is.
Hazard models are common because they directly model the transition probability. An impatient
subject has a lower probability of transition to the later-in-time option than a patient subject.
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option decreases by 25% (= exp(β) − 1) over the baseline tendency. The effect is
stronger for people exposed to the wall and isolated by it: their tendency to prefer
the later option decreases by 38%.38 The combination of these results indicate that
on average those exposed to the wall discount longer time horizons at higher rates
than the unexposed.
More generally, the results accord with the findings in the literature about fe-
males being more patient on average, older people being more impatient, and better
educated people being more patient. As the future may be risky (and risk prefer-
ences are affected by the wall), we control for risk aversion as elicited in the risk
preference task. We find that more risk averse people tend to discount the future
more heavily, which is consistent with previous research (Andersen et al., 2008).
The impacts on preferences are not driven by past experiences of violence (see
Tables D.4, D.5, D.6 in Supplementary Material). As an additional sensitivity test
for omitted variables, we compute the statistics suggested by Altonji, Elder and
Taber (2005) and Oster (2019). These tests indicate the degree of selection on un-
observables relative to observables which would be necessary to explain away the
impact of the wall. We present these statistics in Table D.16 in Supplementary Ma-
terial. In most cases, the ratios suggested by these methods are negative. Negative
ratios arise when the observable controls are on average negatively correlated with
the treatment and positively with the outcome (or vice-versa). This implies that our
estimates are, if anything, attenuated towards zero by unobservable characteristics
and can be interpreted as lower bounds of the true impact. We discuss and present
additional robustness checks in Section D of Supplementary Material.
38These results include all subjects answering the same task. If we include those subjects
answering the extended version of the time preference task and use an indicator variable to control
for the type of task, the results are unchanged (see Table D.3 in Supplementary Material).
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Overall, these results suggest that exposure to the wall has affected people’s
preferences: compared to areas without wall, people in communities exposed to
the wall are more risk tolerant, ambiguity averse and more impatient in the long
term. These differences are stronger for people exposed to the wall and isolated
by it. Given this change in preferences the deterrent effect of the wall may be less
than expected.39 These results are in line with the effects expected by the ATF:
a common emotional response to the wall was anger, which is heightened among
people exposed to the wall (see Table B.1). According to the ATF, anger’s core
appraisal dimensions activate an ‘action tendency’ towards risk seeking, impulsivity
and ‘black and white’ thinking.40
We have no direct evidence of whether the changes in preferences observed in
our subjects translate into changes in violent behaviour. However, we geo-referenced
data from PCPSR quarterly opinion poll undertaken in two years close to the time
of our field experiments (years 2011 and 2012, N=1,011). These data show that
within our sampling frame support for armed resistance is significantly higher in
those areas close to the wall. Indeed, the differences are striking: support for armed
resistance is at 21% in areas without wall; it goes up to 33% in areas close to the
wall. Of course, increased support for violence by an individual is not sufficient to
induce that individual to engage in violent actions. The variety of situational factors
that lead to action make the correlation between behaviour and attitude necessarily
less than one (Khalil, Horgan and Zeuthen, 2019). Yet, at the individual level, it
39Based on these findings, the potential identification concern that the wall had been purpose-
fully built to separate risk taking Palestinians from Israel appears implausible.
40A separate matter is the process through which preference change arises: was it an immediate
preference change that persisted or a gradual process which accumulated over time? We are
unable to distinguish empirically between these two processes with our data. However, ATF and
the evidence on recalled emotions would suggest that an immediate yet persistent process is more
likely.
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has been argued that attitudes supporting aggression are a good predictor of violent
actions (see e.g., Kernsmith (2005) in the context of domestic violence; Copeland-
Linder et al. (2012) in the context of aggression). More generally, it has also been
argued that support for violence in the wider community can help motivate the
emergence of violence and resistance (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, p. 206)),
which would make opinions and behaviour likely to be positively correlated in the
aggregate. The direct impact on violent behaviour remains an important avenue for
future research.
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Table 5: Preferences and exposure to the wall
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk aversion Ambiguity aversion Time preferences Time preferences
(patience) (patience)
short horizon long horizon
(OLS) (OLS) (HAZARD) (HAZARD)
(ii) not-isolated, exposed -0.263** 0.197* -0.040 -0.280**
(0.110) (0.115) (0.131) (0.114)
(i) isolated, exposed -0.458*** 0.285*** -0.009 -0.479***
(0.131) (0.103) (0.139) (0.125)
female 0.119 -0.100 0.641*** 0.309***
(0.112) (0.072) (0.104) (0.095)
age (in years) 0.096** -0.032 0.015 0.042*
(0.029) (0.020) (0.027) (0.024)
age (squared) -0.001** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
income -0.017 -0.014 0.035 -0.009
(0.025) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020)
education 0.053 -0.102** 0.184*** 0.144***
(0.046) (0.034) (0.041) (0.035)




period dummies (baseline hazard) Yes Yes
Observations 237 245 1272 1278
♯ Subjects 237 245 212 213
R-squared /L* 0.109 0.104 -732* -715*
The dependent variable in column (1) is an (ordinal) categorical variable increasing in risk-aversion; in col-
umn (2) is a categorical variable increasing in ambiguity aversion; in columns (3)-(4) is a binary indicator
coded 1 from the period (choice situation) in which a subject switches to the delayed option in short horizon
task and long horizon task, respectively (the model is estimated using a proportional hazard model, using a
complementary log-log function). Variable ‘(ii) Not-isolated, exposed’ is a dummy variable = 1 if the subject
lives in a community in group (ii), i.e. on the east side of the wall (‘not-isolated but exposed communities’);
variable ‘(i) isolated, exposed’ is a dummy variable = 1 if the subject lives in a community in group (i), that
is a community between the Green Line and the wall; the reference category is group (iii), ‘not-isolated and
not-exposed’. Variable ‘age’ is subject’s age measured in years (and its squared); variable ‘female’ is a dummy
variable = 1 if the subject is female; ‘income’ is a categorical variable indicating income level categories (0-1000,
1000-1500, 1500-2000, etc.); ‘education’ is a categorical variable indicating educational attainment. Clustered
bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Ordered probit specifications for models in columns (1) and (2)
yield qualitatively identical results. Using OLS specifications with the switching points as dependent variable
also yield qualitatively similar results. The main results are robust to inclusion of village level variables, such
as altitude, population density and the proportion of households owning a PC (a proxy for village income).
Observations include rational subjects in each task.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The principle of deterrence is advocated by many rational agent models and applied
to counter-violence initiatives. The main assumption in these models is that prefer-
ences remain unchanged, and the logic of deterrence follows from this assumption on
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preferences: deterrence policies will decrease armed actions once and for all. Con-
trary to this, we show that preferences of Palestinians affected by a major deterrence
policy, the wall between the West Bank and Israel, have changed in response. These
findings are in line with the theoretical insights from social psychology which argue
that deterrent policies generating anger and reactance, in turn change the prefer-
ences of affected people in ways which are less conducive to appeasement. Our
findings show that Palestinian individuals directly exposed to the wall are more risk
tolerant, sensitive to uncertainty and, for long time horizons, more impatient than
people living in areas without the wall. These effects are stronger for people living
in areas cut off from the West Bank mainland and thus more severely affected by
the wall. Our analysis also reveals more support for armed action from the same
population at the aggregate level.
At a theoretical level, the paper makes two contributions. First, our findings
reveal a new behavioural explanation as to why certain deterrent policies may not
work as expected and possibly create backlash. The reason rests on the possibility
that the parameters that govern people’ valuations of net gains from committing po-
litical actions change after the policy. The different valuations in turn cause changes
in political behaviours beyond (and possibly in opposition to) what is expected from
the deterrent. Specifically, if one conceives acts of aggression as risky, higher risk
tolerance and impatience increase the perceived gain from aggression, because indi-
viduals place less weight upon the riskiness of actions and possible future costs.41
41Thinking of acts of aggression as risky prospects is intuitive and accords to existing theoret-
ical models of aggression. Yet, at least theoretically, acts of aggression can also be perceived as
ambiguous prospects. However, the long lasting nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict makes
the range and frequency of the consequences of violent actions known, familiar and predictable,
making it more likely that they will be perceived as risky rather than ambiguous. Dacey (1998)
discusses known punitive measures applied throughout the years; at the aggregate level, Durante
and Zhuravskaya (2018) and Jaeger and Paserman (2008) illustrate the predictability of Israeli
counter-violence response using time-series data.
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Increased ambiguity aversion is also associated with difficulties building trusting re-
lationships (e.g. Li, Turmunkh and Wakker, 2019). Absence of trust may prompt
both retaliatory and pre-emptive violent acts and, in extreme cases, can “plunge so-
cieties in vicious cycles of recurrent conflict” (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013,
p.1114). We do not have evidence on trust per se, but the diminution of trust is
one mechanism through which increased ambiguity aversion may encourage more
violence and thus undermine deterrence in this context. Ambiguity aversion may
also dissuade engagement in peace negotiations, whose outcomes have inherently
unknown probabilities, by increasing support for known states of the world, like the
status quo.42
Secondly, we extend previous research on the effectiveness of deterrent poli-
cies by combining theoretical insights from social psychology with a rational choice
framework, and then empirically testing these insights in the context of a real de-
terrent initiative. Our results point to the importance of considering the emotional
responses to explain the direction in which these policies may be changing the cal-
culations of net gains from action. Our findings support an association between
anger/provocation and changes towards more risk tolerance, aversion to uncertainty
and myopia. These findings speak in favour of theoretical models with endogenous
preference formation, as opposed to fixed and unalterable preferences typical of more
traditional economic models. More generally, the existing evidence on the impact
42It is possible that violent acts are perpetrated by a small minority or specific groups. An
important question we are unable to test is whether a minority responsible for violence experience
the same changes that we report for the population on average. If the preferences of this minority
are impacted differently than the average effect on the majority, the treatment effect would be
heterogeneous and violence could arise for different reasons than those described in the paper.
Comparing the treatment and control groups shows that the change in the joint distribution of
preferences, for example risk and ambiguity preferences, looks more like a location-shift towards
risk tolerance and ambiguity aversion, suggesting there is limited heterogeneity in the treatment
effect. In general, however, within-subject change in preferences and its heterogeneity is of great
interest for future work.
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of acute life events on preferences can be viewed through the lens of the Appraisal
Tendency Framework, which provides a possible explanation as to why some studies
show different, sometimes opposing, effects of shocks on preferences. For instance,
studies on natural disasters and financial downturns find increased risk aversion in
the aftermath of the shock (Cassar, Healy and Von Kessler, 2017; Cameron and
Shah, 2015; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Cohn et al., 2014), while studies on the
direct exposure to violence from an enemy (Voors et al., 2012) suggest less risk
aversion. These events are likely to differ in terms of cognitive appraisal (e.g. their
pleasantness, controllability and presence or absence of intentionality) and those
differences shape the elicitation of distinctive emotions. These emotions have asso-
ciated action tendencies which drive the behavioural responses to the event. Events
that elicit different emotions will yield different impacts on underlying preferences.
At a practical level, our findings have notable implications for the dynamics of the
long-standing conflict in the region. The results highlight that the wall is a potential
obstacle to peace. Risky acts of resistance may become more desirable for people
who have become more risk tolerant and sensitive to uncertainty. Similarly, attitudes
towards proposed (or to be proposed) peace treaties depend on the immediate costs
and later benefits of the proposal. Greater impatience may reduce the range of
proposals that will be acceptable to individuals when they evaluate the costs and
benefits of their actions.
Looking around the world there are many examples of harsh or repressive policies,
including those where physical barriers have been erected to impose control, seal up
borders and restrict movements (e.g., India and Bangladesh, Belfast, Morocco and
Western Sahara, USA and Mexico, Greece and Turkey, Cyprus). Our results speak
to many such cases, and show that there may be unintended and counter-productive
40
consequences of these measures, due to preference change among affected parties.
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7 Online supplementary material
A: Simple numerical example of how preference change leads
to changes in behavior, other things equal
Suppose an individual has two choices, a safe action yielding gain y (e.g. income),
and a risky activity (e.g. insurgency), yielding y +B if successful (with probability
p) and y − F if unsuccessful (with probability (1− p)), where F is a cost. Suppose
the individual has utility of the form U (y) = (1− η)−1 y1−η, where η is a measure
of their aversion to risk: the higher is η the more risk averse the individual is, and
the more they prefer the certain gain (in fact, this utility exhibits Constant Relative
Risk Aversion). Define η∗ as the level of risk aversion that makes the individual










(y − F )(1−η
∗)
(1− η∗)
If (y, B, F, p) = (50, 9.8, 40, 0.9) and then η∗ = 1. If the agent becomes more risk
tolerant, then η < 1, and he prefers to undertake the risky activity since he now
cares less about risk, and vice versa (stay-safe action) if he becomes more risk averse,
i.e. if η > 1. With fixed punishments and payoffs, an individual may change their
appraisal of the utility maximizing action if their risk preferences change.
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Figure B.1: Sampling frame and the wall’s route
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As discussed in Section 2, the design of our questionnaire was informed by the
ATF. Table B.1 records the descriptive statistics by treatment group of recall data,
collected after the experiment was undertaken, on levels of anger, fear and sadness
at the moment they found out the wall was built. The strength of emotions is
measured on a 10-point scale. Table B.1 shows that subjects exposed to the wall
report levels of anger and sadness that are significantly higher than subjects in the
control group without the wall. These data provide some evidence in support of the
ATF as an explanation for preference change.
Table B.1: The wall and emotional responses
Anger Fear Sadness
(i) isolated exposed 8.541 6.583 8.895
(ii) not-isolated, exposed 8.871 6.115 8.717
(iii) control 7.619 6.476 7.833
Test of differences
(i) vs (ii) No diff No diff No diff
(i) vs control Yes (**) No diff Yes (**)
(ii) vs control Yes (***) No diff Yes (***)
Intensity of emotions are measured over a 10-point Likert scale. Test for differences
are done using F-tests in regressions controlling for clustering at the village-level: ”No
diff” indicates no statistically significance difference; ”Yes” indicates a statistically
significance differences and significance levels are represented by the stars according
to the convention *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01. These results exclude individuals who
show irrational behaviour in the experimental tasks. Including those individuals lead
to qualitatively similar results.
Table B.2: Attrition and treatment groups
Group Complete Deceased Didn’t Never No Wrong Total
want reachable number number
(i) Isolated and 51 1 1 9 2 9 73
exposed 69.86 1.37 1.37 12.33 2.74 12.33 100
(ii) Not-isolated, 91 0 1 13 3 7 115
exposed 79.13 0 0.87 11.3 2.61 6.09 100
(iii) Not-exposed, 55 0 0 8 0 7 70
not-isolated 78.57 0 0 11.43 0 10 100
Total 197 1 2 30 5 23 258
76.36 0.39 0.78 11.63 1.94 8.91 100
Notes: The table shows the number of people (and the percentages) who completed
the post-experimental survey (column ‘complete’) and those whom we were unable to
contact. For each row of the table, the first entry is the number of observations, the
second entry is a percentage.
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N 115 70 73
female 0.478 0.486 0.452 0.349 0.4 0.097
age 37.600 35.840 35.200 1.351 0.333 -0.975
grade (mean) 4.070 4.014 4.342 -1.352 -1.521 -0.288
no schooling (%) 1.7 - 1.3 0.196 . .
elementary (%) 11.3 10 6.8 1.011 0.679 -0.277
preparatory (%) 17.3 24.2 15 0.418 1.388 1.137
secondary (%) 40.0 38.5 41.1 -0.149 -0.308 -0.192
diploma (%) 7.8 8.5 8.2 -0.096 0.075 0.180
bachelor (%) 20.8 18.5 23.2 -0.391 -0.692 -0.379
monthly income (cate-
gory)
3.574 3.543 4.466 -1.835♮ -1.631♮ -0.211♮
has job 0.774 0.843 0.712 0.93 1.89 1.17
hh size 6.035 5.900 6.178 -0.387 -0.768 -0.393
has child 0.678 0.585 0.643 0.482 -0.710 -1.255
The last three columns provide either t-statistics where data is continuous or (♮) Wilcoxon rank sum test where
data is categorical. These test the equality of means (distributions) between the high and low treatment groups,
the high treatment and the control, and the low treatment and the control, respectively.
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Power calculation details: Due to the uniqueness of the research question
and the field experiments, power calculations were only indicative as we could not
have a strong prior concerning the effect sizes in our experiment. Power calculations
assuming power=80%, confidence level=5% and no intraclass correlation (ICC) for a
range of effect sizes are reported in Table B.4, Panel A. 43 The final empirical sample
is made of 258 subjects (115 individuals from the exposed not-isolated group; 70
individuals from the isolated and exposed group and 73 individuals from the control
group) which has the power to detect effects of between modest and medium size
(following the size classification by Sawilowsky (2009) and Cohen (2013)). In our
quasi-experimental design the allocation to treatment and control is outside our
control and is determined by the route of the wall. Our sampling frame created
symmetry by sampling participants on either side of the wall route and proposed wall
route. Unavoidably, everyone in villages close to the wall is treated (with different
intensities) and everyone in areas without the wall is in the control group. Given
that we anticipate zero ICC, a random sample in each treatment group would have
been appropriate in these circumstances. The treatment is not assigned by cluster
(villages). In fact, some villages are split by the wall. Yet, for the fieldwork, we had
to strike a balance between power and the budget available to us and the importance
(as well as constraint) of maintaining sizable incentives in the experiments. For these
budgetary reasons and the implementation logistics, we employed a two-stage cluster
sampling design (and not because we expected spillover effects of the treatment or
contamination of the control group as typical in cluster randomized control trial).44
For robustness, all our regressions have clustered bootstrapped standard errors to
take into account the sampling design and any possible intra-cluster correlation.
Power calculations assuming cluster treatment design and an ICC set at 0.01, shown
in Table B.4 Panel B, suggest that our study is sufficiently powered for a medium
sized effect size (we have 4-7 clusters (villages) in each group and a sample of more
than 15 for each cluster).
43No intraclass correlation is a reasonable assumption because the outcomes are individual pref-
erences and the tasks were conducted in private. We also sampled participants with the purpose of
maximizing independence between observations: only one person per household, randomly selected,
which avoids for example the correlation arising from assortative matching based on preferences
between spouses or parent-children/siblings homogeneity.
44Stage one: a subset of clusters is randomly selected from the relevant population - villages
5km either side of the wall route. Stage two: individuals are sampled randomly from the clusters
using a ”random route” technique, selecting every 5th house/apartment building in each selected
street.
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Pilot and training: The experimental tasks were piloted, in English and Ara-
bic, in various sessions with students at the University of affiliation of authors,
Palestinian students at the University of Birzeit and Palestinian adults with no
higher education. The explanation of the experimental tasks was accompanied by
visual instruments. Five female Palestinian enumerators were trained over 1 and
a half day training with the authors, during which enumerators conducted mock
elicitation and interviews among themselves and with the authors.
Instructions: A particular concern was the possible sensitivity of questions
involving risk in a predominantly Muslim population. Our enumerators read a
consent script before the start of the interview, asking individuals if they were
willing to answer a few questions and play some experimental games to understand
how Palestinian make decisions in uncertain situations.45 It is noteworthy that
Palestinians are much less conservative than other Muslim societies and monetary
games based on chance exist as TV shows (for example, the TV show ’Asandox’ -
i.e. the box). In the tasks’ explanation, we intentionally used wordings similar to
Callen et al. (2014) who administered a similar risk task in Afghanistan, a much
more conservative Muslim society. The instructions were translated from English
to Arabic (local dialect) by a researcher familiar with the experiments and were
extensively discussed between her and the authors. Time of fieldwork was planned
to be amenable to people’s daily schedules. Refusal to take part in the surveys was
seldom and no systematic differences across areas were noted.
Incentives: All decision tasks in this paper are incentivized with real money.
All subjects are paid in task 1 (risk) and task 2 (ambiguity), with disbursement of
money in cash at the end of the interview. Due to the budgetary constraint, for task
three (time preferences) we adopted a payoff scheme such that one single subject
45The script read ”We are studying decision-making in Palestine: we are interested in under-
standing how Palestinians make decisions in uncertain situations of every day life. We would like
to ask you some questions and play few experimental games with you. Experiments are an impor-
tant tool in economic research because they help to understand how people make decisions. By
participating you have the opportunity to gain some money. Would you like to participate?” The
interview began with few general questions. Before the first experimental task started, participants
were reminded about what the task involved and given the possibility to drop out (no one did):
”Now we would like to do an experiment. Experiments are an important tool in economic research
because they help to understand how people make decisions. I am going to ask you to make several
choices. There is no right or wrong answer; we just would like to know the choice you like best.
You may earn some money in this task. I am not asking you to make a gamble: we just want to
understand how you would respond to naturally occurring risk. [... task is explained]. Before we
start do you have any questions about this part of the study? Are you ready to start?”.
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per locality is paid out a (randomly) selected decision (according to the subject’s
own choice). As the localities are small, this payment scheme retains the incentive
compatibility. All efforts were made to generate trust of payment disbursement
among the respondents. Respondents were given specific contact details and they
were told the payment is guaranteed by the University of London. Respondents
randomly selected the payable alternative by throwing a 12-sided die and were given
a certificate to record the selected alternative and the amount to which they are
entitled if selected for payment. Due to religious condemnation on the practice
of loaning money with interest in Islam (which is considered as usury), we do not
present individuals with the market interest they face, nor explicit information about
the implied rates of return. This information is revealed in previous studies to avoid
any possibility of arbitrage from the lab to the field (Harrison, Lau and Williams,
2002). It is unlikely that our subjects misrepresent their responses to invest the
money in the market. We also elicit loss-aversion. The loss aversion task was not
incentivised due to budgetary limitations. For consistency we exclude any discussion
of these results in this paper.
Irrational behaviours: Subjects can potentially switch from one option to
the other more than once in the multiple choice lists presented, signaling misap-
prehension of the tasks. About 6.5% of our subjects switched more than once in
Task 1 (risk preferences over gain); 3.8% in Task 2 (ambiguity attitudes); and 1.5%
in tasks 3 (time preferences). Earlier studies with similar tasks show comparable
shares of multiple switching: for task 1, for example, Callen et al. (2014) document
12.7 percent of multiple switching from a sample of Afghan respondents. Another
way of assessing misapprehension is to look at subjects’ irrational choices in the
first and last choice situation in task 1 and task 2, which involve the impossibility
and certainty of winning some amount, respectively (and higher than the alternative
option). 4 subjects (1.2% of the sample) display either of these behaviours in task
1 (risk preferences) and 3 subjects (1% of the sample) in task 2 (ambiguity). We
exclude from the analysis subjects who show either multiple switching or irrational
behaviours.
Outside options: A possible confounder of our results stems from the possi-
bility that different outside options across treatment and control groups influence
the way in which subjects respond in the decision tasks. The influence of outside
options on the responses in the tasks could arise if the tasks’ monetary amounts,
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albeit nominally identical, were valued differently across treatment areas, or if the
probabilities presented to subjects were perceived differently. Different valuations of
nominally identical amounts could be reflected in economic factors such as different
labour opportunities, wage levels or interest rates available in the geographic area;
differences in valuations of probabilities could be reflected in subjective assessments
of general probabilistic events. We have addressed each of these points and find no
evidence of any differences in outside options. We now provide a summary of these
findings; the tables showing these results are available from the authors on request.
To address the concern of possible differences in employment opportunities we
analysed data from the Census 2007. These data show that there are no differences
in the composition of the labour force between treatment and control groups. The
differences in the percentages of employed, unemployed, people currently studying,
housekeeping and retired, are very small in terms of Cohen’s d -statistics. Further-
more, if there were differences between groups in the marginal utility of income,
one would expect to see differences in the consumption of basic and durable goods.
Again using the 2007 Census we show that there are no appreciable differences
(Cohen’s-d) in expenditure on basic foodstuffs like bread, fish, milk and coffee, or in
more durable goods like mobile phones and satellite dishes. With regard to interest
rates, Interest on money is forbidden by Islam. For this religious reason any kind of
credit is usually sourced from within the family, making household size a good proxy
for these opportunities. Again, we find no significant differences across treatment
and control groups in household size. Another test of the impact of outside options
is to check the stability of the treatment effects to control variables that proxy possi-
ble outside options, such as income, education, age and gender. Our analysis shows
that the results are also robust to this test: the magnitude of the treatment effects
is not affected by the addition of control variables. Finally, in order to test whether
probabilities in our decision tasks are likely to have been interpreted differently in
different groups we use data that we collected on probabilistic expectations to show
that there are no significant differences (see Table D.17). Taken together, we find
no evidence that outside options are confounding our results.
Descriptive Statistics: Table B.3 provides some sample’s descriptive statistics
and basic tests of balance between the two treatment groups and the control group
with regard to some key socio-economic variables. None of these tests show any
significant differences, with the exception of income for which differences in means
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are significant only at the 10 percent significance level. Income is controlled for in
the main regressions. This provides evidence that the differences in preferences are
not due to differences in the composition of these groups.
Attrition: Table B.2 is concerned with the level of attrition encountered in
the follow-up telephone survey. Among the treatment and control groups there is
no evidence that this process of attrition, which was somewhat minor anyway (we
obtained a 76 percent response rate), would systematically bias the results since
attrition is balanced across treatment and control groups.
Table B.4: Power calculations for estimating sample sizes
Panel A: Effect sizes (individual randomization design)
small modest medium large
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.8
N per treatment 394 100 64 26
Panel B: Effect sizes (clustered randomization design)
N clusters per treatment 30 8 5 2
Obs per cluster 15 15 15 15
Obs per treatment 450 120 75 30
Power calculation assumptions in Panel A: power=80%; alpha=0.05; ICC=0.0.
Power calculation assumptions in Panel B: clustered randomization design,
power=80%; alpha=0.05; ICC=0.1. Effect size classification adopted from Saw-
ilowsky (2009) and Cohen (2013).
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C: Exogeneity and Selection Bias
The tables in this section are referred to in Section 3 and provide evidence to support
treating the location of the wall as a natural experiment. Table C.1 presents the
mean and test statistics from the pre-wall data (Census 1997). Column (1) presents
means for what is now ‘group (i), isolated and exposed’ communities; column (2)
for ‘group (ii), exposed, not-isolated’ communities; and column (3) for ‘group (iii),
not-exposed’ communities. The last three columns in Table C.1 report Cohen’s d
statistics.46 The large majority of effect size statistics in Table C.1 are well below
0.2, hence of trivial magnitude.
Table C.2 shows the proportion of migrants and emigrants that flow from each of
the surveyed areas and from abroad. These percentages are small and rather similar
for each area, indicating that changes in the composition of populations is unlikely
to confound the causal interpretation.
Table C.3 reports the respondents’ average age at marriage and average age when
moving back to the location of origin in treatment and control areas. Again, these
ages are practically identical.
Figure C.1 shows the age distributions over time across areas and shows that
there is no statistical evidence of differences in age composition across areas that
would support a claim of systematically different migration among these communi-
ties.
Finally, Table C.4 shows the duration of residence for each of the treatment areas
from the surveyed sample, not the census.
46Cohen’s d measures ‘effect size’ as the scaled difference between means: δ = µ1−µ2
σ
, where µ1
and µ2 are the mean of group 1 and 2 respectively and σ is the pooled sample standard deviation.
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Table C.1: Selection: Summary statistics from 1997 Population Census
Population Census 1997 - individual level data















N 5415 787,561 15059
female 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.003 -0.012 0.014
age < 5 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.012 0.000 0.013
age 5-18 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.005 0.011 0.005
age 18-65 0.45 0.44 0.44 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002
age 65+ 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.018 -0.010 -0.007
schooling (age>18)
mean 9.27 9.61 9.74 0.131 0.033 0.087
10th percentile 5 5 5
25th 6 6 7
50th 9 9 10
75th 12 12 12
90th 14 15 14
education attainment
(%)
can read and write 27 28 25.7 -0.028 -0.050 0.024
elementary 29.7 27.4 26.5 -0.071 -0.019 -0.051
preparatory 25 23.4 27.9 0.063 0.105 -0.038
secondary 11.1 11.8 11.1 0.000 -0.020 0.020
diploma 4.5 4.5 5.3 0.038 0.040 0.000
bachelor 2.2 4 2.8 0.035 -0.057 0.087
education attainment
(female, %)
can read and write 33.3 33.7 31.1 -0.047 -0.055 0.008
elementary 31.1 26.8 26.1 -0.116 -0.019 -0.096
preparatory 22.5 22 28 0.122 0.145 -0.012
secondary 8.5 10.3 8.6 0.001 -0.057 0.058
diploma 3.1 4.1 4.6 0.067 0.024 0.047
bachelor 1.2 2.6 1.5 0.023 -0.072 0.089
education attainment
(male, %)
can read and write 20.9 22.6 20.8 -0.001 -0.042 0.040
elementary 28.3 27.9 27 -0.029 -0.021 -0.008
preparatory 27.4 24.7 27.7 0.006 0.069 -0.062
secondary 13.6 13.2 13.5 -0.003 0.008 -0.012
diploma 5.8 4.9 6.1 0.012 0.054 -0.040
bachelor 3.3 5.3 4.1 0.041 -0.052 0.089
master and PhDs 0.43 1.1 0.51
marital status (%)
single 39.9 39.9 39.7 -0.003 -0.005 0.001
engaged 3.2 1.5 1.1 -0.190 -0.034 -0.130
married 53.2 53.9 55.5 0.048 0.034 0.010
divorced 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.010 -0.007 0.020
widowed 3.1 3.8 2.8 -0.010 -0.051 0.030
age at marriage 21.9 21.5 20.4 -0.331 -0.212 -0.078
10th percentile 16 16 15
25th 18 18 17
50th 21 21 20
75th 25 25 23
90th 28 28 26
hhold size 6.9 7.4 7.1 0.062 -0.096 0.128
10th percentile 3 4 4
25th 5 5 5
50th 7 7 7
75th 9 9 9
90th 11 11 11
children < 6 (propor-
tion hhsize)
0.19 0.21 0.21 0.071 0.003 0.068
10th percentile 0 0 0
25th 0 0 0
50th 0.14 0.188 0.16
75th 0.33 0.33 0.33
90th 0.5 0.5 0.5
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Table: C.2 Migration flows, pre-wall period (1997-2001) and post-wall period (2002-2007)
Period 1997-2001 Period 2002-2007
Area Area
Treated Treated Control Interior Restricted Treated Treated Control Interior Restricted
(high) (low) Control* (high) (low) Control*
% of emigrants from each area relative to
population in area of origin
1.0898% 0.5923% 0.8898% 1.0590% 1.0800% 2.7923% 1.2740% 1.4488% 2.5631% 1.7846%
% of immigrants relative to population in
area of destination
Emigrants from T high to 0.0525% 0.0060% 0.0000% 0.0024% 0.0000% 0.1576% 0.0170% 0.0000% 0.0049% 0.0000%
Emigrants from T low to 1.4774% 1.8002% 0.8792% 0.5479% 1.0539% 3.1246% 5.1119% 1.7414% 1.1986% 1.7662%
Emigrants from Control to 0.0000% 0.0153% 0.3742% 0.0019% 0.0000% 0.0276% 1.3031% 0.0034%
Emigrants from Interior to 0.2630% 0.6371% 0.0946% 1.0996% 0.0979% 0.6336% 1.6581% 0.2157% 3.1582% 0.2450%
Emigrants from Restricted Control* to 0.0000% 0.0116% 0.0018% 0.4173% 0.0000% 0.0200% 0.0024% 1.3042%
% of immigrants from abroad relative to pop-
ulation in area of destination
1.8979% 2.5408% 2.4804% 2.3309% 2.5698% 1.4099% 1.5373% 1.2869% 1.6045% 1.2457%
Source: Author calculations from the Palestinian Population, Housing and Establishment Census 2007, Palestinian Bureau of Statistics. ‘Restricted Control’ comprises





























Not-isolated (<5km) Not-exposed Isolated
Age profile: 0-5 6-16, 17-49, 50+






























Not-isolated (<5km) Not-exposed Isolated
Age profile: 0-5 6-16, 17-49, 50+
Distribution of population age profile (in 2007)
Figure C.1: Age profile (in 1997 and 2007, Population Censuses)
Notes: Label ‘Not-isolated’ refers to group (ii), label ‘Not-exposed’ refers to group (iii)
and label ‘Isolated’ refers to group (i) as defined in Table 1.
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Table C.3: Mean age (in years) of migrants by treatment and
by reason for changing residence location
Reason: Marriage Reason: Returning to
location of origin
Age at marriage Age when returning
Treatment (high) 21.35 26.23
Treatment (low) 21.27 26.54
Control 20.96 24.76
% of migrants 25% 24%
Source: Author calculations from the Palestinian Population, Housing and Establishment Census 2007, Pales-
tinian Bureau of Statistics.
Table C.4 Months lived in the community, people born outside current locality, means
Mean (µi) T-stat: H0: µi - µgroup(iii)
(i) isolated, exposed 242.2 1.27
(ii) not-isolated, exposed 281.6 -0.36
(iii) not-exposed 299.5
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Figure D.3: Time Preferences over short and long time horizons
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Table D.1: Risk aversion, village-level controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(ii) Not-isolated, exposed -0.274* -0.266* -0.279 -0.259 -0.267**
(0.138) (0.140) (0.178) (0.177) (0.121)
(i) Isolated and exposed -0.458*** -0.466*** -0.481** -0.460** -0.467***
(0.148) (0.143) (0.167) (0.177) (0.139)
age 0.093** 0.095** 0.095** 0.094** 0.094**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
age (squared) -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
female 0.119 0.121 0.121 0.120 0.121
(0.124) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127)
income -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
education 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.058 0.059
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
has saving -0.103 -0.107 -0.109 -0.106 -0.106
(0.114) (0.113) (0.115) (0.113) (0.114)
lost land -0.056 -0.055 -0.058 -0.057







constant -1.517** -1.512** -1.489** -1.515** -1.502**
(0.674) (0.683) (0.654) (0.685) (0.704)
N 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.111 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112
Variable ‘has saving’ is an indicator variable coded 1 if the subject reports to have
savings; the variable ‘lost land’ is an indicator variable coded 1 if the subject lost
private land as a result of the wall construction; variable ‘altitude’ is the mean altitude
of the village; ‘density’ is the village population per km2 in 2007; ‘proportion of PCs’ is
the proportion of residents owning a PC in the village. Cluster-robust standard error
in brackets.
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Table D.2: Ambiguity aversion, village-level controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(ii) Not-isolated, exposed 0.193* 0.200* 0.170 0.174 0.186**
(0.098) (0.095) (0.111) (0.123) (0.087)
(i) Isolated and exposed 0.286** 0.277** 0.246* 0.253* 0.280**
(0.111) (0.110) (0.132) (0.133) (0.096)
age -0.034 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 -0.035
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
age (squared) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female -0.100 -0.098 -0.097 -0.096 -0.099
(0.112) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
income -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
education -0.100** -0.099** -0.098** -0.099** -0.093**
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038)
has saving -0.047 -0.054 -0.059 -0.055 -0.046
(0.060) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066)
lost land -0.053 -0.051 -0.047 -0.056







constant 1.476*** 1.472*** 1.521*** 1.473*** 1.611***
(0.386) (0.392) (0.417) (0.400) (0.391)
N 245 245 245 245 245
R2 0.104 0.106 0.107 0.107 0.110
The variable description is in notes to Table D.1. Cluster-robust standard error
in brackets.
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Table D.3: Time Preferences - Entire sample
Short-horizon Long-horizon
(ii) Not-isolated, exposed -0.062 -0.243**
(0.116) (0.105)










Modified task 0.268* -0.744***
(0.157) (0.156)
risk aversion -0.225*** -0.362***
(0.047) (0.043)
N 1645 1652
The regression include data from subjects answering a version of the time pref-
erence task with 10 pairwise choices.
Robustness
This section presents additional robustness tests.
Conflict exposure.— Previous research suggests that exposure to violence alters
preferences (Voors et al., 2012). A possible confounder of our results is that past
experiences of violence related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict drive the observed
differences rather than the experience of the wall. We exploit our survey question-
naires to test both direct and indirect exposure to conflict. Table D.4 (for risk
preferences), Table D.5 (for ambiguity preferences) and Table D.6 (for time prefer-
ences, long horizon) provide evidence against this alternative explanation. The main
results are not affected by the inclusion of conflict exposure measures, which include
experiencing detention or physical injury due to the conflict, having a household
member detained or injured due to the conflict, being displaced and index measures
of conflict exposure experienced personally or by a family member. The conflict
exposure proxies are not significantly associated with preferences, suggesting that
conflict does not affect preferences directly. Table D.8 shows that including inter-
actions terms between conflict experience and wall exposure does not change the
overall findings, although there is some costs in terms of estimates precision. Over-
all, conflict exposure does not seem to affect preferences directly in this context.
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Selective migration.— As we discussed earlier, migrants may have different pref-
erences than non-migrants. Because of the permit regime in place in isolated areas,
migration is minimal and, if few cases occurred, took place before the wall was built.
This is confirmed in our data and in the Population Census data discussed in Sec-
tion 3. Here we provide additional tests of selective migration by testing whether
the main results are driven by subjects who moved residence. To do so, we include
an indicator variable of whether the subject was born outside the sampled villages
in our regressions (Table D.7). The differences in preferences in subjects exposed
to the wall remain significant. This suggests that differences in preferences across
groups are not driven by selective migration.47
Additional robustness checks.— Income shocks may affect preferences directly.
All our regressions control for the respondent’s income. Note that if it was nega-
tive income shocks driving our results we should have observed a decrease in risk
tolerance, as risk tolerance usually increases in income. Instead, we observe the
opposite. In this section, we present results addressing six additional concerns for
the main results. First, it may be that behavior in the field experiments is affected
by the context of enforced limited mobility which may have affected pre-wall social
networks. Plausibly, the wall has altered the transaction cost of traveling for the
isolated group. Social networks are well known to provide collective insurance and
losses in this insurance function could well affect behavior in other risky situations.
Using visits to family members in the interior of the West Bank (further than 10km
from the location of residence) as a proxy for social networks, we find no significant
differences in family visits depending on wall exposure (Table D.9) Under the as-
sumption that there was no difference in visits before the wall, this evidence does not
47One may also be concerned that contact with the Israelis, a Western society, may have some
influence on values and preferences. Further analysis shows that our results are robust to the
exclusion of subjects who report working in Israel or Israeli settlements in our sample. In the
general population, contact with Israelis is rare: using information from the 2007 Census data,
the shares of the population in these communities who work in Israel are low and similar across
groups: 1.02% in group (i), ’isolated and exposed’ communities; 2.04% in group (ii), ’not-isolated,
but exposed’ communities; 1.30% in group (iii), communities without wall. These percentages were
also small before the wall construction and similar across community groups, hence it is unlikely
that our results are explained by some forms of contact or exposure to Israel (according to the
Census 1997 data, the shares of the population working in Israel were 11.1% in group (i), 9.9% in
group (iii), 6.4% in group (ii). )
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support the hypothesis that the transaction costs have dramatically altered social
networks.
Second, very religious respondents could have systematically biased responses
to the risk and ambiguity decision tasks because the risky urns might have been
seen as gambling. Overall, the issue of association between the proposed tasks and
gambling did not emerge as a problem in the pilot phase nor one that was reported
by enumerators. In an additional decision task involving a choice between flipping
a coin for a hypothetical prize or loss or not playing, 10% of subjects preferred
not to play indicating religious motives. We use this information as a proxy for
religiosity in order to test whether more religious people are systematically more
risk-averse (tolerant)/ ambiguity-averse (loving) than other subjects. We observe
no differences in their elicited preferences (see Table D.10). We also estimate a
Simultaneous Equation Model to take into account the possibility that potential
common factors jointly explain risk and ambiguity preferences (see Table D.15).
The results maintain.
Third, multiple switching and irrational behaviors may be an indicator of misap-
prehension of the games and we exclude those subjects from the main analysis. This
exclusion poses a problem if attrition is systematically related to wall exposure as
we would measure preferences on a biased sample of rational respondents. Columns
1-3 in Table D.11 show no significant differences in attrition depending on treatment
status. It may be that experiencing episodes of conflict may have generated cogni-
tive difficulties which manifest in irrational behavior in the decision tasks. Column
4 in Table D.11 shows that conflict exposure is not related to irrational behavior.
Fourth, previous studies have found that subjects making sequential decisions
may be influenced by prior outcomes. One example is the ‘house-money effect’
whereby one observes increases in risk-taking following prior gains (Thaler and John-
son, 1990). Table D.12 shows that gains in task 1 (risk) have not affected decisions
in task 2 (ambiguity).
Fifth, it has been argued that subjective probability of risk may change after
experiencing adverse life events (e.g. Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). The role of
beliefs in constructing subjective probability is irrelevant in our risk tasks where
probabilities are given and well-defined. However, one may argue that if the wall
influences probability assessments systematically, then this may influence responses
in the ambiguity task where probability are not defined. In order to test for dif-
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ferences in probability assessments by groups, we collected information on beliefs
about a variety of uncertain life outcomes: future job loss (in the next 12 months);
job insecurity, i.e. the probability of losing a job and not finding an equivalent one
(Manski, 2004); life expectancy; expected out-of-pocket medical expenses and ex-
pectation on future standards of living. Table D.13 shows regression of subjective
expectations in various domains of life on dummies for each treatment group. We
find no significant differences in expectations across various domains of life. These
findings lend some support to the view that the wall had not affected the way people
form subjective probabilities.
Finally, since we have a limited number of villages, we check the robustness of
our results to alternative methods of inference. These tests are shown in Table D.14.
We use randomisation inference and compute the p-values of the treatment effect
between isolated communities and communities without wall by simulating all possi-
ble random assignments of the treatment and calculate the p-value under the sharp
null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero for all observations. The difference
between treated and control communities remains significant for risk preferences
(p-value 0.024) and ambiguity preferences (p-value 0.08) and becomes noisier for
time preferences (p-value 0.21). We also check the robustness of our treatment ef-
fects to Wild-bootstrap-t clustering of the standard errors as suggested in Cameron
et al. (2008) and the p-value from regressions using village-averages (adjusted for
individual covariates, as suggested in Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
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Table D.4: Risk aversion and conflict exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(ii) Not-isolated, -0.261* -0.264* -0.261* -0.260* -0.266* -0.266* -0.265* -0.263*
exposed (0.147) (0.145) (0.139) (0.146) (0.146) (0.141) (0.142) (0.140)
(i) Isolated and -0.469** -0.461** -0.470*** -0.461*** -0.449*** -0.457*** -0.456** -0.457***













conflict exposure (indiv) -0.057
(0.123)
conflict exposure (hhold) -0.058
(0.123)
N 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.114 0.110 0.111 0.109 0.114 0.110 0.110 0.110
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is a (ordinal) categorical variable of risk preferences where the higher value
indicates greater risk-aversion. The variable ‘conflict exposure (indiv)’ is an indicator variable equals to
1 if the individual has personally experienced an injury, displacement or witnessed violence. The variable
‘conflict exposure (hhold)’ is an indicator variable equals to 1 if the individual has had a member of
the household injured or detained. Controls include age, age squared, gender, income, education level.
Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets.
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Table D.5: Ambiguity aversion and conflict exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(ii) Not-isolated, exposed 0.193* 0.196* 0.194* 0.206* 0.197* 0.198* 0.197* 0.191
(0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.111) (0.104) (0.107) (0.104) (0.109)
(i) Isolated and exposed 0.293** 0.287** 0.288** 0.278** 0.281** 0.281** 0.283** 0.278**













conflict exposure (indiv) 0.031
(0.108)
conflict exposure (hhold) 0.137
(0.132)
N 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245
R2 0.111 0.105 0.104 0.107 0.105 0.107 0.104 0.112
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is a (ordinal) categorical variable of ambiguity preferences (averse, neutral,
tolerant) with higher value indicating ambiguity aversion. The variable ‘conflict exposure (indiv)’ is an
indicator variable equals to 1 if the individual has personally experienced an injury, displacement or
witnessed violence. The variable ‘conflict exposure (hhold)’ is an indicator variable equals to 1 if the
individual has had a member of the household injured or detained. Controls include age, age squared,
gender, income, education level. Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets.
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Table D.6: Patience and conflict exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(ii) Not-isolated, exposed -0.279** -0.289** -0.295*** -0.305*** -0.290** -0.286** -0.274** -0.283**
(0.114) (0.115) (0.113) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.114)
(i) Isolated and exposed -0.477*** -0.477*** -0.509*** -0.478*** -0.487*** -0.482*** -0.476*** -0.481***













conflict exposure (indiv) 0.050
(0.103)
conflict exposure (hhold) -0.030
(0.089)
N 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278
The dependent variable is a binary variable = 1 from the period in which the later
in time option is preferred. The variable ‘conflict exposure (indiv)’ is an indicator
variable equals to 1 if the individual has personally experienced an injury, displacement
or witnessed violence. The variable ‘conflict exposure (hhold)’ is an indicator variable
equals to 1 if the individual has had a member of the household injured or detained.
Controls include age, age squared, gender, income, education level, risk aversion, and
dummy for periods. Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets.
Table D.7: Selective Migration
Risk aversion Ambiguity aversion Patience (long-horizon)
(ii) Not-isolated, -0.207* 0.218** -0.249**
exposed (0.105) (0.099) (0.111)
(i) Isolated, -0.396*** 0.312** -0.442***
exposed (0.116) (0.110) (0.123)
born outside -0.293** -0.105 -0.354**
the village (0.118) (0.090) (0.087)
controls Yes Yes Yes
N 237 245 1278
R2 0.132 0.109 na
Notes: Controls include age, age squared, gender, income categories, education
(and risk aversion for patience) as described in notes to Table 7. Cluster-robust
standard errors in brackets.
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Table D.8: Preferences, wall and conflict interactions
Risk aversion Ambiguity aversion Patience (long horizon)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(ii) Not-isolated, exposed -0.492524** -0.659895** 0.242136 0.355234* -0.342618 -0.305249
(0.227) (0.226) (0.206) (0.195) (0.242) (0.295)
(i) Isolated, exposed -0.696068** -0.752250*** 0.339716 0.333523* -0.406340 -0.199502
(0.318) (0.190) (0.240) (0.198) (0.255) (0.315)
female 0.099015 0.115259 -0.092565 -0.102325 0.306566*** 0.336790***
(0.131) (0.125) (0.094) (0.090) (0.095) (0.097)
age 0.097510** 0.095993** -0.032340 -0.030715 0.044860* 0.042247*
(0.040) (0.040) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
age (squared) -0.001097** -0.001070* 0.000270 0.000245 -0.000581* -0.000552*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
education 0.055661 0.058435 -0.102365*** -0.100373*** 0.144741*** 0.144487***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
income -0.018736 -0.012979 -0.014189 -0.018725 -0.011285 -0.006547
(0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
risk aversion -0.406449*** -0.402893***
(0.048) (0.048)
conflict experience (hhold) -0.437315* 0.263072 -0.039662
(0.233) (0.200) (0.244)
conflict (hhold) X group (ii) 0.563198* -0.235917 0.080459
(0.301) (0.232) (0.275)
conflict (hhold) X group (i) 0.417208 -0.086362 -0.101583
(0.271) (0.237) (0.291)
conflict experience (ind) -0.280564 0.076518 0.121575
(0.291) (0.203) (0.286)
conflict (ind) X group (ii) 0.298194 -0.061774 0.054053
(0.324) (0.240) (0.318)
conflict (ind) X group (i) 0.309510 -0.074204 -0.336261
(0.387) (0.272) (0.340)
Observations 237 237 245 245 1,278 1,278
R squared 0.114 0.124 0.104 0.117 na na
Notes: conflict exposure (indiv) is an indicator variable equals 1 if the individual has personally experi-
enced an injury, displacement or witnessed violence. Conflict exposure (hhold) is an indicator variable
equals 1 if the individual has had a member of the household injured or detained. Cluster-robust standard
in brackets.
Table D.9: Changes in social networks
Visits to family living in the West Bank further than 10km away
Groups N mean median
(i) Isolated and exposed 24 7.04 3
(ii) Not-isolated, exposed 48 11.39 4
(iii) Not-exposed 14 5.07 2
Notes: The statistics are number of visits to family members in the West Bank main-
land further than 10 km from the location of residence (conditional on having family
members living in the West Bank mainland).
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Table D.10: Preferences and religious motives against gambling, mean
test
Religious motives Group (ii) Group (iii) Group (i)
Not-isolated, Not-Exposed Isolated and
exposed not-isolated exposed
Risk: (mean) switching point
yes 5.55 4.85 4.6
no 4.69 5.48 4.56
T-test (µno − µyes) -1.22 1.26 -0.05
Ambiguity: (mean) switching point
yes 5 4.88 5.33
no 4.48 5.01 4.37
T-test (µno − µyes) -1.4 0.19 -1.29
Table D.11: Attrition from experimental tasks
Dependent Var.: displayed irrational behaviour in at least one task (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(ii) Not-isolated, exposed -0.073 -0.078 -0.080 -0.080
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
(i) Isolated, exposed -0.090 -0.090 -0.095 -0.095
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
female -0.058 -0.057 -0.059
(0.041) (0.041) (0.046)






constant 0.186*** 0.118 0.028 0.036
(0.047) (0.079) (0.109) (0.113)
N 258 258 258 258
R2 0.012 0.028 0.032 0.032
F-test of joint significance 1.256 1.634 1.423 1.254
The dependent variable is a indicator variable equal to one for respondents switching multiple
times or showing irrational behaviour in at least one of the tasks (the two behaviours are
considered together because the low number of observations precludes a separate analysis
for each task). Conflict exposure is an indicator equals to 1 if the individual has personally
experienced an injury, detention, displacement or witnessed violence related to the conflict
with the Israelis. OLS coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table D.12: Experimental bias
Dep. Var: ambiguity switching point
Group (ii) Group (iii) Group (i)
Not-isolated, Not-exposed, Isolated and
exposed not-isolated exposed
payment 30 -0.127 0.427 0.083
(0.000) (0.603) (0.522)
payment 90 -0.327 0.239 0.452
(0.404) (0.525) (0.558)
constant 4.727*** 4.727*** 4.235***
(0.307) (0.457) (0.454)
N 107 67 71
R2 0.006 0.008 0.015
F test 0.342 0.251 0.502
Notes: Payment 30/90 indicates the amount won (in sheckels) in Task 1. The excluded
category is zero payment.
Table D.13: Expectations and wall exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)* (6)*
job loss job insecurity life expect70 medical expenses improve child life improve life style
(ii) Not-isolated, -5.936 -1.912 3.834 -8.387 0.147 0.225
exposed (7.437) (7.799) (4.990) (5.125) (0.213) (0.182)
(i) Isolated, -8.728 -5.352 0.396 -6.609 0.277* 0.125
exposed (8.496) (8.604) (4.705) (5.333) (0.155) (0.191)
constant 39.0714*** 25.928*** 47.403*** 71.038*** - -
(6.858) (7.626) (4.089) (4.517)
N 196 196 190 184 196 194
R2 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.016 - -
Notes: (1) Job loss is the percentage chance of loosing the job (conditional on working). (2) Job insecurity
is the combination of the chance of loosing a job and not finding an equivalent one, as in Manski (2004). (3)
Life expectancy is the chance to reach the age of 70 (respondent with inconsistent responses are excluded).
(4) Medical expenses is the chance of spending more than NIS 500 in out-of-pocket medical expenses over the
next year. (5) The dependent variable is a categorical measure indicating the expectations about children’s
standard of living when they will have the age of the respondent in comparison to the respondent’s nowadays
standard of living (from 1, much lower, to 5, much higher). (6) The dependent variable is a categorical variable
indicating the expectation of the respondent’s standard of living in ten years time being lower, the same or
higher. Coefficients in (1) to (4) are estimated using OLS. *:(5) and (6) are estimated using ordered probit.
A probit on a two-category variable reclassification in (6) leads to qualitatively the same results.
Table D.14: Randomization inference and standard errors robustness
checks
Treatment effect (isolated vs. control) p-values





Cluster-robust (0.009) (0.022) (0.030)
Randomisation Inference (0.024) (0.087) (0.210)
Wild-cluster bootstrap-t






Table D.15: Simultaneous Equation Model Estimation
Risk aversion Ambiguity aversion
(ii) not-isolated, exposed -0.243* 0.208**
(0.132) (0.102)




age (in years) 0.111*** -0.040*
(0.031) (0.024)










The tables estimates a system of equations for risk and ambiguity preferences. The
number of observations include rational subjects in both tasks.
Table D.16: Omitted Variable Bias: Altonji (2005)/ Oster (2019) ratios
Control set Risk Ambiguity Time (short) Time (long)
Altonji, Elder, Taber (2005) test
(i) isolated, exposed as in Table 6 [<0] [<0] [<0] [<0]
(ii) not-isolated, exposed as in Table 6 [<0] [<0] 0.786 [<0]
Oster (2019) bias-adjusted test
(i) isolated, exposed as in Table 6 [<0] [<0] na na
bounds for β [-0.687, -0.458] [ 0.285, 0.832]
(ii) not-isolated, exposed as in Table 6 [<0] [<0] na na
bounds for β [-0.532, -0.263] [0.197, 0.539]
The table reports the degree of selection on unobservables relative to observables which is required to
produce a treatment effect of zero, using the methods of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) and Oster (2019)
(the δ in their papers). The entry [<0] indicates that the respective ratios are negative. This is because
the observable controls are on average positively correlated with the outcome variable and negatively
with the treatment, suggesting a downward bias in the OLS estimates (provided the unobservables have
similar correlation patterns with the outcome and the treatment as the included observables). The
control variables included are those presented in Table 5 of the paper. The bounds for β are calculated
according to Oster (2019), page 18, using the conservative assumption that the maximum explainable
variation is 1 (Rmax = 1) and delta = 1. Oster (2019)’s methods is tested for linear regressions and
therefore we do not attempt implementation for the hazard models.
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